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ABSTRACT 
 
Workers’ right to strike is embedded in the South African Constitution and this right 
generally reflects a sign of fairness. Strike activities form a vital part of collective bargaining 
and the supremacy liaison between employers and employees would be severely ruined if 
workers are not entitled the right to strike. Ever since the right to strike was documented in 
the South African Constitution, strike actions have been a collective occurrence in the 
country. Reasons for strikes in South Africa are multi-layered and their effects are harmfully 
disastrous. Workers are on strikes due to various reasons such as low pay, inequality, and 
unemployment as a result of union conflicts and the inequitable degree of labour relations. 
However, strikes would lead to various problems in the economy, such as reduced 
production, scaring off investors, labour replaced by capital, etc. 
 
This study first defines the various key concepts relating to industrial action, before 
reviewing the theories on strikes as well as the results of past local and empirical studies. The 
study moves on to use the Department of Labour’s 2003-2014 Industrial Action Report data 
to provide descriptive statistics on strike activities in 1999-2014 by broad industry categories 
(examining the number of strikes, work hours lost, work days lost, time-loss ratios, principle 
causes of strikes, most active trade unions involved in strikes), before using a static approach 
to estimate the value of total production foregone as well as the value foregone as a 
proportion of gross value added (GVA) by industry in each year as a result of strikes. Finally, 
the older 1970-1998 strikes data from the International Labour Organization (ILO) is 
‘merged’ with the abovementioned 1999-2014 data, to examine the econometric relationship 
between strikes and business cycles, and it is found that strikes are procyclical. 
 
Keywords: Industrial relations, work stoppages, lockouts, trade unions, collective 
bargaining; South Africa. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Statement of problem  
Strikes signify the vital agreements of workers, represented by trade unions, to implement 
their demands for higher wages, improved working conditions and unbiased behaviour by 
employees (Jacobs & Yu, 2013:2). If trade unions are not present or if they do not have the 
power to enforce accurate collective bargaining, the government could intervene to resolve 
disputes between employers and employees. Even though strikes are seen as a process of 
liaison between employers and employees, and point towards a democratic economy, it 
results in economic cost that can be extremely high, depending on the duration of the strike, 
the number of employees involved and the industries affected (Jacobs & Yu, 2013:2). These 
costs consist of, amongst others, working days lost, earnings and output foregone and knock-
on effects in other sectors (Barker, 2008: 101-102).  
 
It is important to empirically evaluate the impact of strikes on the South African economy, 
because strikes have extensive negative effects on the entire economy. On the other hand, as 
a result of the complex nature of strikes, seldom can one empirically measure the effects of 
strikes on the economy (Myers and Saretto, 2009). The mining sector is one of the most 
important industries within the South African economy. In 2014 the mining sector, on 
average accounted for 8.33 per cent of South Africa’s Gross Value Added (GVA). The 
mining sector has made significant contributions to the South African economy in terms of 
creating numerous job opportunities within the sector, attracting foreign direct investment 
(FDI), export earnings, and by contributing to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Chamber 
of Mines, 2013).  
 
The Department of Labour (DoL) (2013) indicated that even though the mining sector 
contributes approximately 5 per cent to the overall GDP of South Africa, it surprisingly 
makes up 50 per cent of the country’s total exports. The significance of the mining industry 
can be justified by its substantial impact as an investor into the South African economy. 
Therefore, any interference to the production process of the mining sector can have extreme 
consequences on the economy. Strike action in the mining sector has resulted in a number of 
work hours lost, and this affected production. As a result of this many workers lost their job 
in the mining industry (Department of Labour, 2013).  
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The consequences of strike action range from economic to socio-political effects. Strikes 
have far and extensive cost to the economy as a whole (Murwirapachena & Sibanda, 2014: 
556). Israelstam (2011) stated that “strike means disaster for both parties”; firms who 
experience a decline in production level and lose business contracts, and the workers who 
could potentially lose their jobs. Hence, due to strikes, employers, the government, third 
parties, workers, and the whole economy suffer. Even though, strikes have a direct effect on 
employment, there are also indirect consequences on employment that originate from the 
shutdown of firms, trade shortages, and a fall in investments, among others. The relatively 
high strike incidences of the mining industry in August 2012 had the potential to increase 
public unrest in the economy (Bhorat, Naidoo & Yu, 2014). Therefore, strikes have a 
substantial influence upon the production of the mining sector and, as a result indirectly 
affect the entire economy.  
 
Strikes do not only have economic effects, it can also impact the social fiber of the economy. 
In various cases, strike action could turn out ugly with a lot of individuals either dying or 
being injured due to the violent nature of strikes (Murwirapachena & Sibanda, 2014:558). 
Hence, the employees and their families could experience poverty, as a result of striking 
employees being unable to work owing to injuries, retrenchments, or even death. 
Consequently, the government will have to intervene by providing financial support to 
employees and families suffering from strike injuries, retrenchment, and the death of their 
loved ones (Murwirapachena & Sibanda, 2014:558). 
 
Major strikes were triggered in the labour history of South Africa during the twentieth 
century as a result of extensive and severe endemic industrial unrest. This industrial conflict 
molded part of a liberating process in which disputes in the field of labour were formed, 
particularly with regards to the relationship between capital and the government (Visser, 
2004: 2). Astonishingly, hardly any publications have been made on strikes in the labour 
history of South Africa up to now. The main reason for the lack of local studies conducted is 
the non-availability of comprehensive strike data up to 2002. Since 2003, the Department of 
labour (DoL) has finally been releasing the data publicly and regularly with the release of the 
Annual Industrial Action Report. Therefore, due to the non-availability of strike data publicly 
until 2002, the older studies are very superficial, lacking in-depth research on how strikes 
affect the South African economy.  
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1.2  Rationale and significance of the study 
This study explores the extent to which industrial action impacts the South African economy. 
In particular, the study focuses on the economic cost of strikes and examines the impact of 
industrial action on economic growth across all broad industry categories. This research 
problem is important, because industrial action creates economic cost that is important to the 
economy. Conversely, South Africa’s strong trade union undertaking and strike activity have 
resulted in frequent work rigidity, wage rigidity and high job losses which can affect the 
economy negatively. The study will also provide additional information on how to estimate 
the cost of strikes by using international literature because there are no South African studies 
done on this topic. The lack of thorough local empirical studies on strikes justifies the 
significance of this research. 
 
1.3  Research objectives 
The study will analyse the cost of strikes as measured by the number of work stoppages, 
working days lost, time-loss ratio, working hours lost and earnings foregone by broad 
industry category. However, there are three main empirical components that will be discussed 
in the methodology section. Firstly, the descriptive statistics will be discussed by each broad 
industry category for the period of 1999-2014. Secondly, by assuming production equals 
income, total value of production foregone due to strikes will be estimated as the product of 
total work hours foregone and the mean hourly wage, ceteris paribus. Lastly, the empirical 
analysis will be discussed, by conducting a multivariate econometric analysis on the two 
strike composite indices for 1970-2014. In particular, the study will focus on the overall 
extent of strikes during the period of 2003-2014, before investigating what has been 
happening across industries and the main causes of the disputes. This information will then 
be used to answer the key research question: What is the impact of industrial action on the 
South Africa’s economy? The study will test the hypothesis that strikes have a negative 
impact on the South African economy.  In order to achieve the main research objectives, the 
following analysis will be conducted: 
 Extent of industrial action by industry; 
 The main causes regarding industrial action; 
 Total work hours and work days lost due to industrial action by industry; 
 Total earnings foregone due to industrial action by industry; 
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 Total value of production foregone and this value as proportion of gross value added 
(GVA) by industry; 
 Brief econometric analysis on the relationship between strikes, labour market 
indicators and business cycles. 
 
1.4  Outline of the study  
The rest of the study is structured as follows: Chapter Two provides a conceptual, theoretical 
and legislative framework. The conceptual framework discusses all the relevant concepts 
relating to the study, while the theoretical framework analyses the important strike theories. 
The legislative framework refers to the Labour Relations Act that allows workers to go on 
strike and it discusses all the relevant legal aspects relating to industrial action. The review of 
past local and international empirical studies also forms part of Chapter Two and it reviews 
all recent local and international empirical studies relating to the study. Chapter Three 
discusses the methodology and data (including the limitations of the data). This will be 
discussed in greater detail later, for this study; a static analysis will be conducted when 
estimating the total earnings forgone due to industrial actions. Chapter Four presents the 
descriptive statistics and empirically estimates the total earnings forgone due to industrial 
actions by each broad industry category, before briefly examining the econometric 
relationship between strikes, labour market indicators and economic growth. Lastly, Chapter 
Five concludes the study. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter first provides the definition of concepts related to this study, including, amongst 
others, industrial action, lockouts, strikes and work stoppages. The chapter will also explain 
how bargaining councils are developed and how they function. This is followed by the 
theoretical framework, which discusses the theories on strikes. The legislative framework of 
strikes will be discussed in relation to the Labour Relations Act (LRA) 66 of 1995 which is 
South Africa’s main legislation in terms of strike action. Finally, a review of the results of 
past local and international empirical studies will be discussed.  
 
2.2 Conceptual framework 
2.2.1 Industrial Action 
Industrial action is described as the movements of unions and employees to force the other 
party into continuous strike disputes. Note that industrial action is generally referred to as 
strikes and lockouts but may also consist of protesting, imposing product sanctions, marches 
by employees, work stoppages and other actions which could interrupt the production process 
(Department of Labour, 2013:50). It is argued that industrial action is both debatable and 
essential (Venter & Levy, 2014:532): it is debatable in the sense that it illustrates an 
important demonstration of disputes inside the work place and by itself, contributes to 
disorders in economic activities. Therefore, industrial action is important because if it does 
not take place (in particular strike action), no significant collective bargaining will exist, or 
there will be no equivalent relationship (Venter & Levy, 2014:532).   
 
2.2.2 Strikes  
Hyman (1984:17) defines a strike as a momentary work stoppage by a group of employees to 
express a complaint or to carry out a demand, while Garbers and Potgieter (2007:300) define 
a strike action as an incentive and a brief suspension of workers’ services from the firm to 
remove concerns in the employment relationship that the employer is willing to offer when 
negotiations takes place. In contrast, Bendix (1996:521) describes a strike action as a short-
term, collective deferral of work, with the aim to put production on hold and force the 
employer to take the demands of the workers seriously. All the above-mentioned definitions 
of strikes are in alignment with the agreed definition of strike action according to Section 213 
of the 1995 Labour Relations Act (South Africa, 2002: s213): strike actions represent a 
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temporary or a deferral of work, by individuals who are currently or have been employed by 
the same employer, in order to resolve a complaint or solve a conflict that is in the interest of 
both the employers and employees.  
 
2.2.3  Lockouts 
A lockout stands for the employer’s form of industrial action, and is described as the 
magnitude of the concluding decision of employees in order to persuade them to agree or 
yield to a specific ultimatum set out by the employers. For the duration of a lockout, 
employers attempt to put in force a demand by the means of stopping employees from going 
into their workplace (Venter & Levy, 2014:548). Lockouts is used as a tool by employers to 
put pressure on unions and workers, such as losing income capacity and settling for 
unfavorable changes in working conditions that is offered by the organization (SASBO, 
1998:3).  
 
2.2.4 Work stoppage  
A work stoppage is developed based on a sequence of procedures, involving similar actions. 
A work stoppage consists of two main features, namely type and degree (Department of 
Labour, 2013: 49-50). The form of act is both a strike (an action started by the workers) and 
lockout (behavior taking place as a result of the employer). A strike action can also be known 
as a labour strike or industrial action, and this can be defined as a work stoppage which 
results in a mass number of employee(s) refusing to work. This refusal to work by 
employee(s) is not specifically related to a demand, however if it is linked to a demand, such 
a demand will not be associated with the employment relationship (Nel, Kirsten, Swanepoel, 
Erasmus & Poisat, 2012:241). Employees refuse to perform their work duties assigned to 
them in order to force the employer to listen to their demands, regarding wage increases or 
better working conditions. In labour management, a work stoppage is seen as a final step 
when arguing over wages or employment circumstances. The reason for this is that workers 
are not being remunerated when they participate in strikes and employers lose crucial 
production work, thus both the parties normally try to avoid such an outcome.  
 
2.2.5  Secondary strike 
A strike or behavior that expands a strike by workers of another employer is referred to as a 
secondary strike. The LRA describes a secondary strike as a strike or action, which is in 
support of a strike by workers that have disputes with their employer. However, it does not 
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consist of a strike that is in a pursuit of a specific demand that has already been mentioned to 
a committee, if the striking employees are hired within a listed range of the committee and 
have a significant concern with the demand (SASBO, 1998:3).  
 
2.2.6  Picketing 
Picketing is an additional set up to a strike (Venter & Levy, 2014:558). It is known as an 
action taken by employers or other individuals to make the presence of labour disputes public 
by guarding or monitoring and being close to the location from where the strike is happening, 
usually with posters demonstrating the reason for their disputes (Department of Labour, 
2003:49-50). 
 
The objective of picketing is merely to make the disputes of the work place public or 
influence other employees to stop working and to motivate employees to join the disputes, to 
prevent scab labour, to sway or force clients not to go into the work place, to interrupt 
distributions or to win over the support of the public (Department of Labour, 2003:49-50).      
 
2.2.7  Protected and unprotected strikes  
A strike is perceived as protected if it takes place at the end of all debate-clearing processes 
that are sketched in the Labour Relations Act or in any negotiating committee or 
acknowledgment/mutual settlement which may happen amongst revelries, have been 
eliminated (SASBO, 1998:3). Unprotected strikes take place when there is a lack of, or 
proceeding to, the wearing out of disagreements that are settled under stipulated procedures 
or those anticipated in the Labour Relations Act (SASBO, 1998:3-4). Formally, these strikes 
are known as being unlawful or bureaucratic. Unprotected strikes are generally impulsive 
actions by employees, and usually take place without the authorization of union 
representatives. They are used as a tool to increase pressure for the duration of indirect 
debates, or when organizations behavior is viewed as being illegal (SASBO, 1998:4).  
 
However, unprotected strikes must be stopped as soon as possible. It is also extremely 
important that organizations focus their attention on solving the disputes in the work place by 
negotiating with unions (SASBO, 1998:4). Currently, there is an extraordinary spark of 
unprotected strikes that exist and carried out by employees. This occur when all the 
requirements of the act is not followed. 
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Whilst protected strikes are bonded by law and help employees to retain their work position 
after the strike (SASBO, 1998:3), in the case of unprotected strikes, employers have the 
legitimate right to lay off workers by following courtly procedures (Norton Rose Global, 
2009). Unprotected strikes are perceived as illegal, and it results in bigger disputes when 
compared to protected strikes in which the correct procedures are followed by law. 
Employers could also adequately prepare and put controls in place to reduce the loss of 
strikes (Israelstam, 2013). 
 
2.2.8  Collective bargaining   
Collective bargaining results from a determined sense of balance such as a comparative 
bargaining authority or power amongst the employers and employees (Venter & Levy, 
2014:532). If the parties involved in collective bargaining cannot solve their disputes, 
industrial action is frequently the outcome. Employees will turn to collective action to 
emphasize their demands. Collective action under these conditions includes the delay of 
supply of labour aimed at a particular time frame, or else denoted as a strike action. 
Collective bargaining and strike action should not necessarily be perceived as being a 
negative incidence in the economy; if it takes place legally, it could be viewed as a sign of a 
well-functioning economy where negotiation and communication takes place (Bhana, 
1997:43-49).  
 
2.3  Theoretical framework  
Brown and Ashenfelter (1986:40-87) found that well-organized contract models provide 
assistance in governing forecasts concerning the outcome of strikes on firms. Trade unions 
(representing the interests of employees) are conscious of the firm’s economic profits and 
want to obtain these profits for their participants. As a result, an effective strike implies that 
part of the firm’s profit is transmitted onto the employees, causing a reduction in the 
shareholder value of the firm. The outcome of the strike on the value of the firm will be 
comparable to the adjustment of profits going to the firm. This was restated by Bhana 
(1997:43-49) when he refers to: “Eaton (1972: 670-679) revealed that strikes have a tendency 
to be worthy investments for unions and deprived funds for firms.” In this sub-section, the 
main theoretical models would be discussed. 
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2.3.1  Hicks strike model  
In the Hicks model, flawed bargaining takes place between two parties when one party 
underestimates the true objectives of the other party, and for this reason strikes occur with 
reference to the Hicks model (Ashenfelter & Johnson, 1969: 35; Reder & Neumann, 1980: 
868: Siebert & Addison, 1981: 390). However, strikes should not occur if the information 
barrier is eliminated between the two parties. Hence, the Hicks model is assumed to be 
information asymmetry (Ashenfelter & Johnson, 1969: 36; Reder & Neumann, 1980: 868; 
Siebert & Addison, 1981:390). If the cost of strikes is comparatively high, strike incidences 
should be lower and the duration of the strikes shorter. This is the main estimate of the Hicks 
model (McConnell, 1989: 801).   
  
Figure 1: Hicks model of strike duration 
 
Source: Laing (2011: 14) 
 
In terms of a theoretical perspective, Hicks presents a model of wages that relates to strike 
action, as displayed in Figure 1. The employer’s concession curve is compared to the union’s 
concession curve in the Hicks model. The firm’s concession curve (CC) is defined as the 
maximum wage rate offered by the firm (Laing, 2011: 13). If the employer’s concession 
curve shows an upward-sloping, it implies longer strike duration and the firm is willing to 
offer a higher wage (Venter & Levy, 2014: 150).  
 
If the estimated period of an industrial stoppage increases, the highest wage the employer is 
willing to offer in order to terminate the strike would also increase (Flatua, 2001:53-55). In 
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other words, the CC curve slopes upwards as the strike duration increases. As the strike 
duration gets longer, the employer starts to worry that production stoppages may persist, so 
he/she would increase the offering wage to the workers on strike, thereby hoping the strikes 
would end as soon as possible. The employer’s concession curve would then be constrained 
directly above the wage at which the employer would have no desire to operate anymore (the 
zero economic profit position) (Flatua, 2001:53-55).   
 
The trade union’s resistance curve (RR) depicts the lowest wage acceptable to unions (Hicks, 
1932:141).A downward sloping resistance curve (RR) of union’s indicate that the unions are 
willing to accept a lower wage settlement, and this implies that the strike duration will be 
longer and more costly (Venter & Levy, 2015: 150; McConnell,1989: 802). The union’s 
resistance wage, at a particular duration of the strike, signifies a sense of balance among the 
two factors. The first is the likelihood of lower wages in forthcoming years, and next is the 
prospect of job losses due to wage suggestions being too high (Laing, 2011:13-14). The RR 
curve is downward-sloping, because as the strike duration increases, the employees on strike 
become more realistic (or even afraid they would lose their job), so they would lower their 
asking wage level as time goes by. However, the lengthier the anticipated extent of the strike, 
the larger is both the loss of income and the odds of job loss (Flatua, 2001:53-55).  
 
In an imperfect capital market, it will be beneficial for workers to decrease the least possible 
accepted wage as the estimated extent of the strike increases (Flatua, 2001:53-55). 
Nonetheless, the maximum wage that the union can attain when both sides have the same 
prospects, regarding the length of the strike is the point where the employer’s concession 
curve and the union’s resistance curve come together (Laing, 2011:13-14). Therefore, the 
Hicks’s model specifies a deterministic wage solution (Flatua, 2001:53-55). 
 
The original equilibrium is at point E in Figure 1 where the curves CC and RR intersect, with 
equilibrium wage and strike duration at w
*
 and t
*
 respectively. The outline of this model 
expects changes to occur in the surroundings that will shift one or the other of the resistance 
curve (RR) and the concession curve (CC); this will have an impact on both the wage 
settlements and the extent of the strike. For instance, the compensation of unemployment 
benefits to protesters decreases the costs of every union member on strike. The outcome of 
this will result in an upward shift of the RR schedule to R′R′. Sequentially, the end result will 
have an impact on the extent of the strike and the final wage agreements (see point E′) 
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leading to an increase in both. Alternatively, any alteration that make the hand of the 
employer stronger will shifts the CC curve downwards (despite not being shown in Figure 1), 
resulting in a lower wage and shorter strike duration. Therefore, the equilibrium of the two 
curves represents the acceptable wage to both parties.   
  
2.3.2 Asymmetric information model 
The primary assumption of this model is that one party (the firm) has private information 
about the economic rent created by the firm, and therefore employees strike to dig up 
additional information about the surplus generated by the firm (Fudenberg, Levine & Ruud, 
1985; Gunderson, Kervin & Reid, 1989; McConnell, 1989; Laing, 2011). Strike action is 
instigated by workers and unions to force employers to come to an agreement, regarding 
demands for higher wages (Bhorat, Lundall & Rospabe, 2002; McConnell, 1989). The union 
uses strike action as a tool to obtain private information on economic rent that the firm is 
accumulating (McConnell, 1989). 
 
The private information models states that the country is overflowing with both doubt and 
inadequate information. Strikes can, therefore help to generate adequate information (Hayes, 
1984; Fudenberg, Levine & Ruud, 1985; Tracy, 1986; Gunderson, Kervin & Reid, 1989; 
McConnell, 1989). For instance, unions do not know the exact demand for a firm’s product 
and the firm might not want to disclose such information. Therefore, firms constantly claim 
that there is a weak demand for their merchandise in the market and therefore they persuade 
the unions to accept lower wage offerings. As a result, unions could use strikes to find out 
whether the firms are dishonest about the state of their products within the market and for that 
reason, be able to achieve a suitable wage settlement. 
 
As discussed by Reyniers (1998), it is often expected that firms have an information 
advantage in wage bargaining models. This advantage allows them to be acquainted with the 
value of their employees, whereas employees are somewhat unaware of their own worth. 
However, from an empirical view point, Ashenfelter & Johnson (1969) were the first 
individuals who tested a systematic regression analysis of strike statistics. They delivered for 
the most part a long-lasting theory associating strike likelihoods to former real wage 
alterations. On the other hand, Hayes (1984) and Morton (1983) assume that the employer 
holds asymmetric information on the true worth of their manufactured goods. In this instance, 
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the strike is a tool used by unions to demand the employer to pay the wage that is equal with 
this value. 
 
Partial knowledge can stop unions and firms from achieving Pareto optimality (Brown & 
Ashenfelter, 1986). According to Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969) as well as Marchiori 
(1989), it is not possible to construct a bargaining model where both trade unions (who 
represent the employees) and the employers are practical and fully informed, on the other 
hand where the result of the bargaining manner is not Pareto-optimal. Thus, striking activity 
is seen as a case of a Pareto-inefficient bargaining outcome (Brown & Ashenfelter, 1986; 
Marchiori, 1989; Laing, 2011). Nevertheless, it can result in practical actions by firms and 
unions as strikers are a nominal asset in recovering important information (Hayes, 1984; 
Laing, 2011). Asymmetric information models highlight the unions uncertainty about the 
firm’s true financial position and hence the firms actual ability to meet the unions wage 
demands. This is due to management that is better informed about the firms prospects than 
the union.  
 
If we assume that the firm’s economic rent is equal to R100 which is allocated to both the 
trade union (acting on behalf of the employees) and the firm itself, as shown in Figure 2. The 
firm preferred the outcome at point RF as the firm wants to grab a bigger share of economic 
rent (R75) than the employees (R25). However, the union desires point RU on the graph, 
whereby they get R75 for their participants and the firm gets only R25 with this deal. If both 
parties are unable to find a solution during the bargaining process, a strike will occur. Strikes 
tend to be very costly, and the post-strike expenditure arises at point S; where both parties 
retain R40. Had both parties accepted the prestrike settlement at point (R
*
) right at the 
beginning, both parties would have benefited from it by getting R50 each (instead of R40). If 
the unions and firms still cannot settle at a total economic rent of R80 (e.g. perhaps the 
unions want to get R60 while the firms also want to get to get R60, i.e. they refuse to accept 
the equal split of R40 each), the strikes will persist. The economic rent would diminish 
further to, for example, R50. Eventually they agree to each get an equal share of R25 (point T 
in Figure 2), but this is such an inefficient outcome, as they should have settled at R
*
 (R50 
each) right at the beginning.  
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Figure 2: Hicks paradox model of strikes that are not pareto optimal  
 
Source: Borjas (2013: 439) 
 
It is generally perceived that the union will choose a strike threat on the condition of higher 
bargaining expenditures that are related to strikes which are more than made up for by a 
higher wage. Figure 3 illustrates the Ex-Post outcomes for strike and holdout threats. Let v 
represents the firm’s value of the present union labour force that works under contract for 
period T. In general v is drawn from the distribution of F and consists of a positive density f 
with an interval of support [l, h]. However, the firm is the only one who knows the realized 
value of v at the outset of the bargaining.  
 
Figure 3: The Ex-Post outcomes for strike and holdout threats  
 
Source: Cramton &Tracy (2002:9) 
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The unions select a threat θ ∈ {H, S}, at the beginning of the negotiations, where H represents 
the holdout threat and S indicates the strike threat. Until a payment agreement is reached, the 
union choice of threat remains in effect. In the threat θ, the settlement to the union is xθ and 
the payout to the firm is yθ (v) = aθ v − bθ, where aθ ∈ [0, 1) and bθ ≥ 0. The dispute cost is 
captured by the term 1 − aθ during the threat. Throughout, the threat the relative fee change is 
defined by cθ = (bθ − xθ) / (1 − aθ). The slice of “pie” that the union and firm are negotiating 
over (the difference between the settlement and threat payouts) is denoted by (1 − aθ) v + bθ 
− xθ = (1 − aθ) (v + cθ), since the total payment during the settlement is indicated by v and 
the total payment of the strike threat θ is aθ v − bθ + xθ. 
 
The Holdout threat can also be described in further detail. For instance, let w0 signify the 
payoffs under the expired labour settlement. The terms and conditions remained in effect of 
the labour settlement that was made previously during the holdout and the employees’ wages 
remain w0, so xH = bH = w0 and cH = 0. During a holdout some inadequacy was detected 
where, aH < 1. Cramton and Tracy (1992) signaled an equilibrium using three propositions. 
Figure 3 indicates an example of the third proposition imposed by Cramton and Tracy 
(1992).The third proposition is denoted by;                   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
If w
0
 <?̃?, the union selects the strike threat; if w0 <w̃, the union selects the holdout threat, 
where ?̃?=𝑥𝑆 +  (1 − 𝑎𝑠 )(𝑚(𝑐𝑆) + 𝑐𝑆 )[1 − 𝐹(𝑚(𝑐𝑠))] − (1 − 𝑎𝐻)𝑚(0) and m(cθ) 
maximizes (M).  
 
The result of this negotiation process between the firm and union is signified by 〈t, w, and θ〉. 
This includes the time of the payment t where t∈ [0, T], the threat chosen by the union θ, and 
the wage settlement w. Conversely, the union and firm payouts are calculated by adding the 
threat payouts and the settlement payouts together, weighted by the fraction of the result of 
time spent. Therefore, the union will prefer the holdout threat if recent wages are below the 
terminated labour settlement, as illustrated in Figure 3.  
 
In Figure 3, the strike threat payoffs has been returned to normal at the origin. Hence, if the 
strike threat (S) is chosen, the payment will take place at the wage ws(v). Yet again, this 
reimbursement wage compensate to the union their threat price during the period of the strike 
and more than half of the inadequacy imposed throughout the strike period. If the holdout 
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threat (H) is carefully chosen, then the payment will take place at a wage of wH(v). The union 
will choose the strike threat if and only if the wage difference between the strike and holdout 
threats fund the additional costs to the union which is known as the dispute costs gained from 
the strike threat. For instance, if the real wage below the terminated labour contract is 
increased, the wage differences between the strike and holdout threats, will turn out to be 
relatively smaller, however the addional dispute overheads from the strike remains the same 
(Cramton &Tracy,2002:9).  
 
On the same point, ?̃?, as w0 keeps on infleuncing the unions preferences to change from a 
strike to the holdout threat. The general occurrence of strikes does not solely depend on the  
general occurrence of disputes, but it also focuses on the disputes that includes strike 
actitivies. The alignment of disputes between strikes and holdouts hinge on w
0
 , the threat 
payoffs and the whereabouts of the distribution depends on v. For instance, the model expects 
that the structure of disputes will move in the direction of strikes based on the following 
scenarious: (i) once the duration of a uncompensated inflation, results in the real value of w0 
to drop, and (ii) if the circumstances in the resident labour market are constricted, causing the 
reservation wages of employees to increase in the period of a strike threat. Additionally, if 
there are any level of doubt it will be somewhat consistent over time, at that point the swings 
in the occurrence of strikes will largely be replicated by shifting the arrangement that was 
made in strike and holdout disputes.   
 
Nonetheless, research indicates robust findings with regards to strike frequencies if there is a 
growth in real wages. This is evident from studies conducted by Ashenfelter and Johnson 
(1969), Gramm (1986), Mauro (1982), and Vroman (1989) by means of U.S. data, and by 
Gunderson, John, and Reid (1986) in which they use Canadian data. Similar studies by, 
McConnell (1989) and Vroman (1989) illustrate that the likelihood of a strike occurance is 
positively correlated to the sum of uncompensated inflation during earlier contracts. The part 
that labour-market conditions play is consistent with regards to studies, indicating that strike 
occurrences in the United States is an increasing function of both the growth in development 
of resident work and the positive nonconformities about this development (Tracy, 1986). 
Lastly, the model provide details, behind the reasoning of strike incidence that could be 
procyclic (Harrison and Stewart, 1989a,b; Kennan, 1986). In addition, strike frequency 
increases as a result of the upward shift in u, whereas the existing wage is constant at w
0
.   
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2.3.3 Monopoly Union model 
In the monopoly union (MU) model, the price of labour is set by the union and the employer 
reacts by adjusting the number of workers in order to maximize profits, based on the new 
established wage rate of the firm (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2012:451). It is presumed that the 
union is fully conscious of the fact that a higher wage setting will lead to a lower labour 
demand by the firm. This can be troublesome for unions, because both the wage and level of 
employment is important (Laing, 2011:6). Hence, we assume that the union values both 
wages and employment levels in the MU model demonstrated below and knows the 
preferences of unions to effectively denote the union utility function that hinges on these two 
variables (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2012:451). The utility function is demonstrated by the 
individual indifference curves labeled as V1, V2 and V3 (see Figure 4). A locus of 
employment or wage combinations is demonstrated by every single indifference curve and it 
signifies how the union is indifferent (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2012:451).  
 
Figure 4: Monopoly union model 
 
Source: Ehrenberg & Smith (2012:452) 
 
In order to maintain a given utility level, the union must first be reimbursed for a drop in one 
of the variables (such as employment or wages) by a rise in the other variable (Ehrenberg & 
Smith, 2012:451). As a result of this, the indifference curves are negatively sloped. It is 
presumed that unions are willing to put up with a decrease in employment in return for a rise 
in wages which will grow smaller as the rate of employment drops (Ehrenberg & Smith, 
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2012:451). This, therefore show the property of diminishing marginal rates of substitution. 
As a final point, higher levels of union utility are illustrated by higher indifference curves. 
 
If we assume a scenario in which a union is not present, the wage will be W0 and 
employment will be E0 (at point a in Figure 4) as a result of market forces (Ehrenberg & 
Smith, 2012:452). Collective bargaining in this case will affect this situation, in which the 
union and the employer reach an agreement on a higher wage rate and based on this wage 
rate, the employer will decide the number of union members to hire (Ehrenberg & Smith, 
2012:452). The level of employment will be decided by the employer, by using the labour 
demand curve, this will be contingent on a bargained wage rate. It is assumed that the union 
knows that this action will be taken by the employer and their goal will therefore be to 
maximize utility, which is limited to fact that the wage or employment combination lies on 
the demand curve (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2012:452). The union will prefer to move to point b 
in the figure. This point shows that the indifference curve V2 is just tangent to the labour 
demand curve. At point b wages would be WV and employment EV. The highest utility level 
that is attainable by the union is represented by point b in the figure, given the restraint 
modeled by the labour demand curve.  
 
Moreover, in a bilateral monopoly model, the wage rate could increase by the rise in the 
bargaining power of trade unions. The result of this would be lower employment levels since 
there will be an upward movement along the demand curves by the firms (Brown & 
Ashenfelter, 1986). In addition, once all the parties has made their final decision, negotiations 
are finalized and the contract decided upon by both parties will be executed (Laing, 2011). 
This represents a flaw in the model because there are no counteroffers allowed, once the two 
parties negotiated with each other and, therefore, the MU model generates wage disputes 
since wages is generally determined in the real world by a bargaining process (Oswald, 1985; 
Laing, 2011).  
 
The MU model is very popular in depicting union wages and employment outcomes, partially 
due to the underlying game structure that relates to reality; most collective bargaining 
processes normally provide employers with a freedom of choice over the number of workers 
(Lawson, 2010:4). Nonetheless, the result of the MU model is proven to be not Pareto 
efficient; the union and the firm could both be better off due to wage-employment 
combinations that are not on the labour demand curve (Lawson, 2010:4). This was first 
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evident, by Leontief (1946), with regards to the labour market, and Fellner (1947), made 
further developments before being given a more detailed algebraic and graphical treatment by 
(McDonald & Solow, 1981). 
 
Figure 5 demonstrates the inefficiency of the MU model; the outcome is an area of wage-
employment combinations, illustrated by point A in the figure, whereby at point B at least 
one of the firm and union can be made better off, and avoid making the other party worse off 
(Lawson, 2010:5). The labour demand curve is defined as the locus of points where the firm's 
isoprofit curve is horizontal, and the union's indifference curve is always downward-sloping 
(provided that the union desires higher employment levels at a prearranged wage). Hence, 
Pareto efficiency calls for the tangency of the firm's isoprofit curve and the union's 
indifference curve, which under no circumstances can take place beside the labour demand 
curve (Lawson, 2010:5). 
 
Figure 5: Inefficiency of monopoly union outcome 
 
Source: Lawson (2010:5) 
 
Therefore, another model was developed, in which the firm and union bargain towards 
achieving an efficient Pareto outcome. The underlying principle for such a model is that 
economic agents in a one-to-one negotiation would not leave untapped gains from trade 
(Lawson, 2010:5). This model will be referred to as the Efficient Bargaining (EB) model, to 
be discussed next. 
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2.3.4  Efficient Bargaining model 
A Pareto efficient allocation of labour will take place if the isoprofit and union indifference 
curves are tangent to each other (Lawson, 2010:6). This describes the locus of Pareto efficient 
wage-employment combinations, which, is normally referred to as the contract curve in the 
literature (Lawson, 2010:6). An earlier paper written by Hall and Lilien (1979) stated that 
union preferences can result in a vertical contract curve
1
 or else a download-sloping curve, 
whereas in McDonald & Solow's (1981) expected-utility formulation, the contract curve will 
essentially remain upward-sloping.  
 
The EB model is different from the MU model, as the former model does not point towards a 
situation of unused gains in bilateral negotiation of trade (Lawson, 2010:7). Hence, the main 
censure of the EB model is that its central structure does not seem to relate to reality as 
strongly as the MU model does; we normally do not perceive firms and unions negotiating 
straightforwardly with each other, over the total number of employment and also wages 
(Lawson, 2010:4). The MU and EB models forms part of the two most common alternative 
economic depictions of the wage-employment results of collective bargaining, and these two 
models do have some strong normative implications.  
 
If the MU model is accurate, employment in unionized firms will be inadequately low and 
wages will be extremely high; when conducting a simple efficiency analysis, unions will be 
regarded as socially inefficient institutions and if the power of unions weakens it is to be 
expected that social welfare will increase (this is based on the assumption that non-unionized 
labour markets continue to remain reasonably competitive) (Lawson, 2010:7-8). If the EB 
model could describe realism to a better extent, these conclusions may be proven to be 
untrue; if there is a vertical drawing of the contract curve, the employment level will be 
calculated efficiently, and then employment will also be too high or too low for social 
efficiency (Lawson, 2010:7-8). This result will be less socially inefficient when compared to 
the outcome of the monopoly union. Hence, at whichever rate, it will surely be the case that 
policy references in relation to labour markets will not be the same, and it will depend on 
how correct the model is (Lawson, 2010:8).   
 
                                                          
1
 The Hall & Lilien (1979) vertical contract curve resulted from their assumption of zero income elasticity of 
labour supply; this is evident in (McDonald and Solow, 1981), who also exhibit a downward-sloping contract 
curve that could be the outcome if the union behaved as a community or household. Brueckner (2001) examines 
several ways to determine which way the contract curve slopes. 
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Figure 6 shows the feasible bargaining set A, the union’s indifference curves, and the firm’s 
isoprofit curves. The contract curve illustrated by the line YX, and this plays a key role in the 
economic analysis of bargaining (Laing, 2011). As illustrated, it is made up of the locus of 
tangency points between the firm’s isoprofit curves and the union’s indifference curves that 
lie also within the feasible bargaining set A or lie on its frontier (such as Y and X). The 
significance of the contract curve YX results from the noteworthy facts that (i) all the 
contracts lie alongside the contract curve and (ii) it is evident that all the contracts that lies on 
the contract curve is efficient (Laing, 2011). 
 
Figure 6: Efficient Bargaining model – The Contract Curve  
 
Source: Laing (2011:8). 
 
Any point that lies off the contract curve is not efficient.  This is shown by point B in the 
figure: it is feasible but it is not on the contract curve. It is evident that this contract is not 
efficient and the firm’s profits, and the union’s utility are both increased by the lens BCDE 
because it is feasible. Therefore, any movements alongside the contract curve will severely 
result in lowering either the utility of the union or else cut the firm’s profits (Laing, 2011). In 
relation to point E, all the other points in A will result in making either the firm or the union 
not as well off, suggesting that point E illustrates an efficient contract. 
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2.4   Legislative framework 
The main reason for the implementation of the Labour Relations Act (LRA) of 1995 is to 
“advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and the democratization of the 
workplace by fulfilling the primary objectives of the Act” (RSA, 1995: 8). The LRA controls 
the legislative rights of trade unions; it includes the right to strike, sets collective bargaining, 
and in addition controls the solving of disputes and firing measures (Bhorat, Lundall and 
Rospabe, 2002: 43). Section 64 of the LRA provides the constitutionally imbedded right to 
strike, whereas it also provide employers with the means to lockout. Picketing, secondary 
strikes, and socio-economic dispute actions are also documented in Section 64 of the LRA.  
 
The steadiness of labour has radically not been a viable objective in post-apartheid South 
Africa. Employees’ constitutional rights, as enclosed in the Labour Relations Act (Act 66 of 
1995, which was later amended in 2002), have steered employees towards spending more 
time on protesting and demonstrating every time they feel they have been treated unfairly. 
The Act resulted in the implementation of Section 27 of the Constitution amended civil rights 
of trade unions, supporting collective bargaining, and identifying the right to strike. It also 
provided instruments for the purpose of disputes and introduced Labour Court and Labour 
Appeal Court as a high court, with limited authority to decide on difficulties arising. The 
LRA offers the legislative structure for the development of bargaining councils. In relation to 
the legislation, at least one verified trade union and also registered firms’ are permitted to 
create a bargaining council for a region and segment. The government is allowed to be a 
member of any bargaining councils as a result of this Act, condition on the fact that the 
government is an employer in that region and section where the bargaining council is 
developed in (RSA, 1995:22).  
 
2.4.1 The right to strike and recourse to lockout 
These constitutional rights indicate that if employees are absent from the workplace due to 
them taking part in strike activities and if employer’s forbid employees to enter the place of 
work it will be regarded as a breach in the hiring contract of employees. This will create a 
legitimate holdup in the relationship between employees and their employers (Treu, 
1992:1054). Internationally, most countries only acknowledged the right to strike, and they 
do not recognize the right to lockout. The purpose of this, as disputed, is that imbalances exist 
in the bargaining relationship if workers are given the right to recourse lockout in industrial 
action. However, South Africa’s Interim Constitution secured the right to lockout, the 
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Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 has shown this, by recalling only 
employees’ right to strike.  
 
2.4.2  Collective Bargaining in terms of strike action 
If employees are deprived of their right to strike, the bargaining power of unions will to some 
extent diminish in the collective bargaining process. In the National Union of Metal Workers 
of SA & others v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd the Constitutional Court indicates that “the right to 
strike is important for collective bargaining. It is actually the factor that makes collective 
bargaining work. It is through the process of bargaining that indicates what role the engine 
play in a motor vehicle”. However, the authors Van Jaarsveld, Fourie and Olivier explain 
(2004:908) as cited in (Vettori, 2005:83) that “the right to strike must not be seen in seclusion 
but viewed and understood against the of strikes background.” 
 
The above-mentioned authors at that time quoted Basson (2003) to back up their argument: 
“Once employees are organised in trade unions, they are able to conduct negotiations with the 
employer on a more or less equal footing. But effective collective bargaining can still take 
place only if the demands made by the trade union are accompanied by the capacity to 
embark upon collective action in the form of collective withdrawal of labour as a 
counterweight to the power of the employer to hire and fire employees or to close its plant.” 
 
The Constitution indicates that all workers are entitled to strike. The right to strike is also 
stipulated clearly in the LRA (Vettori, 2005:84). Even though the Constitution does not take 
the employer’s right to lock out into account the LRA does. The explanation of a lockout, 
nonetheless, is to some degree limited to the meaning of a strike and as a result more practical 
to implement. Employees strike over substances that they are allowed to strike over and 
follow the agreed process. The law protect strikers and employees cannot be dismissed from 
the work place for taking part in strike activities. Hence, the employer cannot claim for loss 
proceeds during the duration of strikes from the trade union(s), nor from the person on strike 
(Vettori, 2005:84-85). If an employer fires an employee as a result of being part of a 
protected strike the correct procedures must be followed and if the strike is the only solution 
to resolving disputes, the firing of those employees will be regarded as an unfair removal of 
employees from the work place (Vettori, 2005:84). Hence, the legislature’s standpoint with 
regards to strike action is that it has a genuine role to play in the arrangement of collective 
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bargaining, as long as it is led by efforts to reach agreements by the means of negotiation and 
resolution, and that no other solutions are available. 
 
Furthermore, the most important resolution establishments that were created by the LRA are 
the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation, and Arbitration (CCMA) and bargaining 
councils (Bhorat, Lundall & Rospabe, 2002). The CCMA is an important institution (middle 
party) to resolve labour disputes. Section 64 of the LRA indicates that every worker has a 
right to partake in a strike and to use this right legally, and every single employer has the 
option to lock out, but only if the disputed concern has been mentioned to a council or to the 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation, and Arbitration (CCMA) (Republic of South 
Africa, 1995).  
 
If industrial action takes place it is compulsory for the employers to complete and submit the 
LRA Form 9.2. The form was created to keep record of any dispute action, lock-out or 
industrial action concerning workers (Department of Labour, 2014:41). This form must also 
be filled in by the employer or any pertinent employer organization.  
 
2.5  Review of past empirical studies  
This section will review the past local and international empirical studies conducted on 
industrial actions, and it is evident that there are only few studies done in South Africa. 
 
2.5.1  Review of past local studies 
To the author’s knowledge, there are only fewer than 10 local empirical studies done on 
strikes, with two of them being highly descriptive. First, the study by Van der Velden & 
Visser (2006) compared the strike activities in Netherlands and South Africa in 1900-1998. 
Focusing on South Africa, the authors first provided a comprehensive review on the history 
of strikes, before providing a descriptive analysis on the following four indicators: (1) 
number of strikes (N); (2) number of workers involved in strikes (S); (3) intensity of strikes, 
which stands for the proportion of workers involved in strikes, S/E, where “E” stands for the 
total number of workers; (4) duration of strikes (the total number of work days lost (D)). 
 
Subsequently, authors derived the following four composite indices (I) for each year (t): 
(1) Unweighted index proposed by the authors: 100
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(2) The index proposed by Galambos & Evans (1966) by taking the labour force (W) and 
base year (b) into consideration: 
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(3) The index proposed by Van Kooten (1988), who suggested that the Galambos-Evans 
index should also divide N by W: 
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(4) The index in (3) is revised, as it is argued that the results of the calculation are reliant 
on the selected base year, thus it may better to use a yearly average for the entire 
period as the “base” (i.e. revised Van Kooten index):
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Van der Velden & Visser (2006:9) only presented the full results of index (1) and index (4) in 
terms of simple line charts, and they found that index (1) showed a rapid upward trend in the 
1970s and 1980s, while this only took place in the 1980s for index (4).  
 
Using the 1999-2011 Industrial Action Reports by the DoL, Jacobs and Yu (2013) presented 
the long-term trends on strike activities across trade unions, provinces and industries. They 
found that although there were significant fluctuations in the number of work days lost, an 
upward trend in industrial action still existed over the whole period. The authors also 
conducted a brief correlation analysis between the number of working days lost as a result of 
strikes, inflation rate and real GDP growth rate, and found that in 2004-2007, the correlation 
coefficient between the first two variables was very strong (0.98). Otherwise, the empirical 
work in this factsheet was very superficial since it mainly provided basic descriptive 
statistics.  
 
Murwirapachena & Sibanda (2014) examined the incidents of strike action in post-apartheid 
South Africa. Murwirapachena & Sibanda (2014) studied newspaper and other published 
articles to find the frequency, reasons, and effects of strikes in South Africa. The growth of 
labour movements forms a crucial element of strike incidences in South Africa. South Africa 
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has adapted the Kaufman (2010) core principle which is based on the theoretical and policy 
formulation of industrial relations, and this is evident by workers right and ability to strike in 
the country. Visser (2007) described South Africa’s industrial relations history, particularly 
relating to strikes, as a reflection of the apartheid era. Visser (2007) indicated that even 
though data have recently surface on strike occurrences in South Africa, it does not provide a 
thorough chronological image of strike activities in South Africa. Therefore, there is a lack of 
sufficient research on strike activities in South Africa and this placed further impetus on the 
relevance of this paper.  
 
In general, the common cause of strikes in post-apartheid South Africa is wage increases 
and/or good working conditions. According to Murwirapachena & Sibanda (2014:554) there 
are also additional factors that play a key role in causing labour unrests in the country. These 
factors comprises of competition between unions, poverty, unemployment, and 
discrimination, the use of migrant employees, legacy of apartheid, and employment cuts, 
amongst others (Murwirapachena & Sibanda, 2014:554). Moreover, production levels 
decrease as a result of strikes. Productive work hours are lost through negotiations, 
protesting, and seat-ins during strikes (Murwirapachena & Sibanda, 2014:557). According to 
Pulse (2012) there was a lost in production of 15% during the 41-day strike at Lonmin’s 
Marikana mine in 2011. Murwirapachena & Sibanda (2014:557) revealed that the 41-day 
strike at the mine yielded massive production and export losses. Since, mining contributes 
nearly 5% of South Africa’s GDP and contributes roughly 50% of the entire exports in the 
country.  
 
Murwirapachena & Sibanda (2014:556) indicated that factors such as inequality, poverty, and 
unemployment provide social and economic needs for prospective wage increases. According 
to Hartford (2012), regular workers was deeply angered by the lavish spending of newly 
empowered black entrepreneurs and the lavish spending by newly, and affluent white 
individuals. This fuelled their demands to secure a bigger slice of the economic cake. 
However, it is also important to take into consideration the huge inequality of wage 
differentials between the remuneration structures of CEOs and owners who earn exorbitant 
remuneration (ratios that are a thousand times more) than that of entry level employees in 
South Africa. Factors such as poverty, inequality and fear of unemployment, motivate 
workers to partake in strikes.  
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The core results of this paper by Murwirapachena & Sibanda (2014) indicate that strikes are 
triggered by inequality, unemployment, poverty to the competition between unions and the 
inequitable nature of labour relations. The effects of strikes were also outlined and it was 
recognized as being both social and economic. Conversely, the paper suggested that labour 
market stability could be achieved through the development of good stakeholder relations, 
equality of labour relations, by rotating employees into employers with the use of 
indigenization policies, and by imposing a national minimum wage.  
  
Wood & Glaister (2008) examined the econometric relationship between unionization and 
employee collectivism, and managerial strategies for employee participation and 
involvement. Using the data from a primary survey with a sample size of 663, namely the 
2004 Taking Democracy Seriously Survey, the authors derived a composite index on 
employee collectivism and union organizational presence. This index consisted of numerous 
variables, ranging from “having participated in industrial action”, “having shop stewards in 
workplace” and “attended union meetings at least once a month” to “having a workplace 
forum”, “having a health and safety committee” and “having team work”. It was found that 
older male workers who spoke indigenous (African) languages and were permanently 
employed were significantly more likely to be active in unions, and had quality groups in 
their workplace (i.e. associated with a higher composite index score). 
 
Schoeman, Botha and Blaauw (2010) examined the role that labour conflict plays in the 
persistence of under-employment. In their empirical analysis, capital/labour ratio was used as 
a proxy variable of underemployment, and the following regression was run for the period 
1970-2004: CO = f(LS, STRIKES, RR, DUM, AIDS), where CO = capital/labour ratio; LS = 
labour share; STRIKES = strike frequency; RR = real interest rate; DUM an institutional 
dummy which is equal to 1 for the years when interventions by institutions in favor of labour 
took place (i.e. abolishment of influx control in 1986, implementation of LRA in 1995, its 
amendment in 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002); AIDS = a dummy variable which is equal to 1 in 
1990-2003 when HIV/AIDS prevalence increased dramatically in South Africa.  
 
At the end, the authors found a significant positive relationship between the strike frequency 
(lagged by two years) and capital/labour ratio. This implies that as the frequency of strikes 
increases, the switch to capital is more likely, with the possible secondary effect of higher 
unemployment. Also, there was a significantly negative relationship between the institutional 
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dummy (lagged by two years) and capital/labour ratio. This suggests that the regulation of the 
labour markets increases employment; such a result is not surprising, as labour relation in 
favor of labour may have created certainty in the labour market as a whole. Furthermore, the 
results of the impulse response function indicated that the capital/labour ratio reacted to 
strikes (positive coefficient) and moved away from the equilibrium.  
 
Bohlmann, Dixon, Rimmer & Van Heerden (2014) used a dynamic computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model to estimate the (macro) economic impact of the 2014 platinum 
mining strikes. The authors analyzed four strike situations in order to capture the impact of 
strikes in the platinum industry, where each strike builds on from previous strikes pertaining 
to exogenous imposed shocks. This allowed the authors to prudently examine the impact of 
various components of the shock on the economy. The study showed that real GDP growth 
declined by 0.7 percent, due to the strike alone, and more than half of the downward 
amendment in real GDP growth might be solely as a result of the economy-wide effect of the 
platinum strike.  
 
When the authors modeled simulations, what they observed first was that the metal ores 
mining was significantly smaller than anticipated with regards to the impact on the total 
industry activity. The authors than had an idea to use an amount of capital that stayed hidden 
and the amount of labourers that remained at home, and use this to determine the pro rata 
effect on the production industry. The model revealed that if the industry stopped working for 
duration of time it leads to scarce production and increase of the price of products in the 
markets. The price increases in production led to an increase of the marginal product of 
labour and this resulted in the mines employing more labour, and harder work was required 
than usual in the mines.  
 
The second finding was that the county’s general investment state was significantly 
negatively impacted. The outcome of this finding indicates that the effects are far wider than 
the likely effects of strikes on metal ores and the wide-ranging mining industry. In the first 
two scenarios investment in the industry of the metal ores were kept at baseline levels. 
However, in the last two scenarios investment was declined by 10 percent. The economy’s 
total investment demand dropped by more than 1 percent in 2014. Subsequently, half of all 
the intermediate goods depend on the construction industry and these goods are used for 
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investment purposes, but the commodities were harshly affected, with the output of the 
commodities decreasing by 1.55%.  
 
The last finding by Bohlmann et al. (2014) was that investor confidence plays a key role in 
the modeling of results. The higher nominal wages that were one of the main reasons for the 
occurrence of the strike, as well as the investment scenario discussed previously appear to 
impact the economy only momentarily. On the other hand, if investor sureness obtains a blow 
due to a protracted strike in the mining sector, the outcome of the modeling demonstrates that 
the damage condensed could have a permanent impact on the economy of South Africa.   
 
Jordaan (2016) used a social accounting matrix (SAM)-based Leontief economic-impact 
model to estimate the likely effect of strike incidences in the platinum-mining industry in 
2012. Two situations were established, one that was based on the structure of the model and a 
second in which amendments were made to the reimbursement of workers, and to the 
operating gross surplus. The main results obtained shows that there is a reduction in GDP of 
0.525 percent for the first situation and a decline of 0.494 percent for the second situation.  
 
The outcome of this impact on GDP relates to Bohlmann et al. (2014) in which the authors 
estimate the impact of the 2014 platinum-mining strike and found similar results as Jordan 
(2016). Moreover, if workers are employed for more than one year, and given the loss of 
production, it indicates a modeled loss of nearly 25 000 to provide equal full-time 
opportunities for situation one and nearly 23 300 for situation two. This indicated that for 
every employee that participated in a strike, his/her own job and no less than one other 
worker’s job were placed at risk.  Also, based on the unintentional cost of strikes which 
results in a decrease in GDP, less consumption, a drop in tax income, bigger trade deficits, 
income losses, and the probability of job losses, it is time for the benefits of strike incidence 
to be clearly examine, based on direct and indirect cost (Jordan, 2016:316).  
 
Bhana (1997) conducted econometric analysis to find out the impact of strikes on share prices 
in the period of 1984-1993. The study used the model proposed by Bowman (1983) to 
compute the abnormal returns that relates to each reported strike incidence. The standard 
methodology associated with a strike incident was used to estimate the stock markets’ 
reaction to industrial action. This study found that the beginning of an industrial action is 
related to statistically important, returns that tend to be negatively abnormal. The market’s 
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fast reaction to a strike announcement has significant market efficiency implications. 
Moreover, the results obtained in the study indicate that strikes had a significantly negative 
impact on share prices. The costs of an industrial action do not seem to be temporary, due to 
losses that are sustained during the strike period which is not offset by positive excess 
revenues after making a decision.  
 
The results tend to support the concept that capital markets are typically capable of 
anticipating whether a forthcoming contract cutoff date will lead to a strike or settlement.  
Conversely, the short-term consequences for management are clear in the case of strikes. 
Strikes are expensive to shareholders of companies, since the share returns decrease during 
the time of industrial action announcements, and managers should bear this in mind during 
labour settlements. Secondly, meanwhile long strike periods have a greater cost to 
shareholders; managers should contemplate this for the period of negotiations simultaneous 
with industrial action. Furthermore, managers might be driven to publicly minimize the 
extent of the likelihood of strike costs to display a strong bargaining position to trade unions.   
 
2.5.2  Review of past international studies 
This section examines the international studies done on strikes and various explanatory 
variables influencing the likelihood of strikes. These studies can generally be categorized into 
four groups. 
 
2.5.2.1 The relationship between strikes and wages 
Lacroix (1986) examined the relationship between strikes and the level of negotiated wage 
agreements by using the data on the 1968-1981 wage settlements signed in the Canadian 
manufacturing industry. Focusing on about 400 wage settlements that involved strikes, the 
author conducted the OLS econometric analysis to find out the impact of various explanatory 
variables (vacancy rate, expected inflation, strikes, amongst others) on wages. The results of 
the analysis indicated that wages increased more rapidly when excess demand in the labour 
market was higher (i.e. higher vacancy rate) and inflation was expected to increase. Most 
importantly, the strike dummy (which was equal to 1 when the collective agreement was 
signed after the strike) was found to be positive and statistically significant.  
 
Card (1990) used the 1964-1985 Canadian data on wage settlements in the manufacturing 
industry, which included 2 258 contracts negotiated by 299 firm-union pairs, involving more 
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than 500 employees. Card conducted an econometric analysis to examine how the first 
difference of the expected average real wage was influenced by various explanatory 
variables, including the strike indicators. It was found that, after controlling for inflation, 
regional unemployment and real wage at the end of the previous contract, there was a 
significant non-linear effect of strike duration on real wages. The effect was positive and 
increasing until the strike duration lasted 98 days, before the relationship became negative for 
longer strikes periods (99 days or above).  
 
Blumenfeld & Victorio (2012) studied the impact of the strike intensity on the firm-level 
negotiated hourly wage of janitors (sample size was 3 140) in USA in 1972-1986. The strike 
intensity was defined as the ratio of total work hours spent on strikes to total work hours not 
spent on strike, multiplied by the mean duration of each strike in days. After controlling for 
the bargaining characteristics (e.g. union density), firm-level characteristics (e.g. firm size), 
employee-level characteristics (e.g. gender, race) as well as unemployment rate and inflation 
rate, it was found that there was a significant and negative relationship between strike 
intensity and the negotiated hourly wage: a one-unit increase in strike intensity would 
decrease the hourly wage by US$3.  
 
2.5.2.2 Factors affecting strike probability 
Gunderson, Kervin, & Reid (1986) used explanatory variables such as contract-specific, 
policy and other variables to explain the likelihood of strikes. This study examined 2 437 
private-sector contracts in Canada for 1971-1983. The logit regressions indicated these 
explanatory variables had a significant impact on strike probability: (1) the larger the 
bargaining unit size, the greater the probability; (2) the greater the real wage change in the 
previous contract, the lower the probability; (3) the higher the cyclical unemployment rate, 
the lower the probability; (4) strike probabilities were lower in jurisdictions requiring a 
conciliation officer, an officer and a board, and mandatory (but not employer initiated) strike 
vote and in periods of the anti-inflation board. 
 
Tracy (1986) investigated the determination of the USA’s strike activities in 1973-1977, with 
the sample (n = 1 319) containing information on contract negotiations for which details on 
strike activities were available. Logit regressions were run to investigate the impact of 
various factors pertaining to the likelihood of strike occurrences. It was found that the 
following would significantly increase the probability of a strike occurring: greater volatility 
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of stock returns; smaller size for the firm (as indicated by lower sales in the previous year), 
greater capital-labour ratio, the worker being older, being white, and having more years of 
education.  
 
The other study by Tracy (1987) examined the likelihood of strikes using the same data as in 
his 1986 study, by focusing on empirically testing the asymmetric information model of 
strikes, as he argued that the union may be uncertain about the firm’s future profitability. 
Using the standard deviation of raw returns of the firm as a proxy measure of uncertainty, 
Tracy found that a one standard deviation increase of this measure resulted in a nearly 3% 
increase in the likelihood of a strike, after controlling for other characteristics.  
 
Booth & Cressy (1990) used the 1984 British Workplace Industrial Relations Survey firm-
level data (n = 2 019) to conduct probit regressions on strike probability. The following 
significant findings were observed: (1) strike incidence probability increased with 
establishments size; (2) there was a convex relationship between trade union density and 
strike incidence likelihood; (3) the greater the percentage of skilled workers at the 
establishment, the higher the strike probability; (4) where the establishments was operating at 
full capacity, strike probability was reduced, but where sales were rising or stable, the strike 
probability increased; (5) in establishments where there were payments by results or job 
evaluation mechanisms, bargaining at the plant of organization level, there was a greater 
strike likelihood.  
 
Finally, Jansen (2014) investigated the strike incidence in more than 5 000 companies in 
2009 using European Company Survey data. The results of the multi-level logistic model 
indicated the following significant results: (1) strikes were twice more likely in public sector 
firms; (2) strikes were more likely to happen if the firm size was 100 and more; (3) strike 
likelihood was higher for larger firms with headquarters and subsidiary sites (reference 
group: single/independent organizations); (4) strike likelihood was greater if collective wage 
agreement was reached at a higher level (reference group: firm level); (5) strike likelihood 
was greater for firms with higher union membership rate, greater number of unions, and 
union-dominated work councils.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
32 
 
2.5.2.3 The relationship between strike frequency, strike duration, wages and labour 
relations 
Mumford (1993) used the 1952-1987 data on the coal industry in New South Wales of 
Australia (NSW) to examine strike frequencies, by first running a regression in which he 
found that the previous period’s profit has a significant positive impact on the strike 
frequency, as a change of one standard deviation of the former led to 12% gain in strike 
frequency. Also, a stock of one standard deviation in real wage was associated with a mere 
0.7% increase in strike frequency. In addition, the higher the level of unemployment in NSW 
and the greater the market power (it stands for the proportion of output produced by the four 
largest operator in the coal industry), the lower the strike frequency. These results were 
statistically significant. Furthermore, the greater the physical risks (i.e. higher fatality rate) 
incurred in the workplace would lead to a significantly higher strike frequency. Regarding the 
results of the second econometric analysis, it was found that the capital/labour ratio has a 
significant negative impact on average strike duration, while the average strike duration was 
positively and significantly associated with the level of export. 
 
Campolieti, Hebdon, & Dachis (2014) investigated the impact of collective bargaining 
legislation on the private sector strike incidence, strike duration and wage settlements in 
1978-2008 in Canada. The authors found that collective bargaining legislation had a minimal 
effect upon the incidence of striking activity, but had an important impact on the duration of 
strikes and wage settlements. Three different regressions were run. For the first regression, 
the authors found that the conciliation and mediation in previous contracts as well as larger 
bargaining unions were associated with a significant greater likelihood of strikes in the 
current contract, but the bargaining legislation explanatory variable was insignificant.  
 
For the second regression, larger bargaining unions were associated with significant longer 
strike durations. Regarding the legislation variables, the following explanatory variables were 
found to have a significant positive impact on strike duration: cooling-off period, mandatory 
strike vote, ban on replacement workers, and technical change reopeners. For the third 
regression, the cooling-off period and negotiated reopeners policy variables were found to 
have a significant positive impact on average wage level in the contract, while the 
reinstatement rights and technical change reopeners variables were associated with a 
significant decrease in wage.  
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
Lastly, Blanchard & Philippon (2004) examined the relationship between the quality of 
labour relations and the average unemployment across 18 OECD countries in four decades 
(1965-1975-1995-2003). First, a strike intensity variable was derived by the means of two 
indicators, namely days lost due to strikes and the number of workers involved in strikes of 
the 1960s. Next, a variable on the quality of labour relations in 1999 was derived by the 
means of the firms’ response to the question “are labour relations in your firm cooperative?” 
The answer was given on a scale from 0 (least cooperative) to 7 (most cooperative), and the 
country mean response was derived. Subsequent, instrumental (IV) regressions on average 
unemployment were run, with the 1999 labour relations quality variable being instrumented 
with the 1960s strike intensity variable. At the end, it was found that after controlling for the 
labour institution differences across countries, countries with better labour relations were 
associated with significantly lower unemployment. 
 
2.5.2.4 The relationship between strikes and business cycles 
Kennan (1985) used the 1968-1976 data on contract strikes in the USA manufacturing 
industries to examine the cyclicality of strike duration. A flexible duration model was 
estimated, and it was found that the hazard function for the duration of the contract strikes 
was U-shaped. The level of the industrial production was also found to have a significant 
positive impact on the hazard rate. Strike duration was therefore counter-cyclical, that is, an 
economic boom (or low unemployment rate) in the economy was associated with shorter 
strike duration. 
 
McConnell (1990) studied the role played by aggregate demand conditions, labour market 
and product market in the pattern of strikes over time, by using data from over 6 000 
contracts covering the period 1970-1981 in the USA. First, logistic regressions on strike 
probability were run, by including various explanatory variables. The following factors were 
found to have a significant negative impact on strike likelihood: increase in the 
unemployment rate, increase in the industry price index, increase in producer price index, 
increase in the profitability index, a smaller size of the bargaining unit, and most importantly, 
an increase in business cycle index (it was found that a 10-point increase in the business cycle 
index increased strike probability by 2%). Hence, strike likelihood was pro-cyclical, meaning 
an economic boom leads to an increase in the strike probability. Secondly, OLS regressions 
on logarithm of strike duration were run, and it was found that the industry price index had a 
significant positive impact on strike duration, while the size of the bargaining unit had a 
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significant negative impact on strike duration. There was no indication of any significant 
cyclical variation in strike duration.  
 
Harrison & Stewart (1989) used the monthly data on strikes and lockouts in Canada in 1946-
1983. The descriptive statistics indicated that the number and duration of strikes were 
significantly higher during the trough phase of the business cycle. This is followed by the log 
of strike duration regressed on the cyclical variable (IP), which was constructed as the 
residuals from a regression of a 12-month centered moving average of the logarithm of the 
index of industrial production on a cubic spline in time. Time trend variables, as well as 
industry and region dummies were also added. It was found that strike durations were 
counter-cyclical. The other study by Harrison & Stewart in 1994 investigated the cyclicality 
of a strike probability and the frequency of strikes using the 1946-1988 Canadian data. The 
results of the econometric analysis indicated that the strike likelihood was pro-cyclical, 
particularly in the manufacturing firms. Strike frequency was also found to be pro-cyclical. 
 
Devereux & Hart (2008) used the British engineering industry’s records of strike activities in 
1920-1970 to investigate the cyclicality of strike likelihood, strike duration and strike 
outcomes. In the econometric analysis, it was first found that strike likelihood was pro-
cyclical, as a lower unemployment rate was associated with a greater strike probability. 
Secondly, strike duration was counter-cyclical for both wage and non-wage related strikes.  
Thirdly, strike outcome (this dummy variable was equal to 1 if the strike was successful – 
achieving a partial gain or a completely successful resolution for the union) was more 
favourable to the trade unions when the unemployment rate was lower, i.e. strike outcome 
was pro-cyclical. This implied that when there was positive economic growth (or lower 
unemployment), the trade unions were more successful in getting favourable outcomes such 
as a higher wage and better working conditions.  
 
2.6  Conclusion 
The general notion is that strike action has a widespread of harmful influence on the 
economy. However, adding to the difficulty of the character of strikes, rarely can one 
empirically measure the effects of strike movements on the economy (Myers and Saretto, 
2009). Nonetheless, it is a fact that strikes effects the economy negatively. Across the world, 
strike motions are associated with instant effects, including loss of production which reduces 
the GDP, and the long-term effect, such as loss of investment which has a negative effect on 
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the GDP of a country (Economic Research Division, 2010). Several strike models were 
created to provide answers to why strikes occur, the causes of strikes and how to solve strike 
disputes but many of these models were constrained by the lack of available data. Past studies 
conclude that even though industrial action are seen as a process of relationship between 
employers and employees, and indicate a democratic economy, they generate economic cost 
(consisting of working days loss, earnings and output foregone, as well as creating knock-on 
effects on other subdivisions (Barker, 2008: 101-102) that can be extremely high, conditional 
on the extent of the strike, the amount of labours involved and the divisions affected. 
 
Finally, upon reviewing the results of past local and international empirical studies, the 
international empirical studies generally concluded that strike probability, frequency and 
outcomes were pro-cyclical but strike duration was counter-cyclical. In contrast, there are 
only few local studies conducted on the impact of strike activities on the South African 
economy. This added new stimulus to the significance of this study. 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will first discuss the methodology and data, as well as the limitations of the data 
before examining the impact of industrial action in Chapter Four on the economy of South 
Africa. Thereafter, the data sources used to corroborate the study will be provided. The data 
was obtained from Statistics South Africa’s using their Quarterly Employment Statistics 
(QESs), October Household Surveys (OHSs), Labour Force Surveys (LFSs) as well as from 
the Quarterly Labour Force Surveys (QLFSs), the Annual Industrial Action Reports and the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) labour database; the data will be used to provide a 
solid bases for descriptive statistics and empirical analysis. A static analysis will be 
conducted when estimating the total earnings forgone due to industrial actions before a brief 
econometric analysis will be conducted. 
 
3.2  Methodology 
The study will use descriptive statistics and a quantitative approach when investigating the 
impact of strike activities on South Africa. First, various descriptive statistics will be 
presented by each broad industry category
2
 for the period of 1999-2014
3
, if possible: (1) the 
level and trend on the number of strike incidents; (2) number of workers involved in the 
industrial action incidents; (3) total work hours, work days and earnings foregone; (4) the 
principal cause of disputes; (5) trade unions most actively involved in the industrial actions; 
(6) time-loss ratios. As far as (6) is concerned, the South African time-loss ratios would be 
compared with what has been happening internationally. The time-loss ratio is measured as 
the number of working days lost per 1000 workers as a result of strikes. More specifically, 
the time-loss ratio provides data that allow comparisons between different industries and 
countries with various employment sizes (Department of Labour, 2013: 51).  
 
Secondly, by assuming production ≡ income, total value of production foregone due to strikes 
is estimated as the product of total work hours lost and the mean hourly wage, ceteris paribus 
(i.e. static analysis is conducted, by assuming the work stoppages would not affect the 
                                                          
2
 There are 9 broad industry categories in total: agriculture, mining, manufacturing, electricity, construction, 
wholesale and retail trade, transport, financial intermediation, community services. 
3
 In all the available Industrial Action Reports, only the results of two consecutive years are presented in each 
report, without thoroughly examining what has been happening to each strike indicator over the long period of 
time. Hence, this study aims to fill this data analysis gap by presenting what has been happening in 1999-2014, 
and even including a longer “time-series” analysis by including the 1970-1998 ILO strikes data for the analysis. 
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activities of those who do not join the strikes and other sectors). The detailed methodology of 
this static analysis is explained as follows:  
 The DoL releases total work hours lost due to strikes by industry  iH ; 
 Information on mean monthly income of non-agricultural formal sector employees by 
industry  iY  in 2004-2014 is available from Statistics South Africa’s Quarterly 
Employment Statistics (QES). Regarding the mean monthly income of formal 
agricultural workers, it is estimated by using the data from the 2004 to 2007 Labour 
Force Surveys (LFSs) and the 2008 to 2014 Quarterly Labour Force Surveys 
(QLFSs); 
 The mean usual weekly work hours of formal sector employees in each industry  ih  is 
available in the LFSs and QLFSs; 
 The mean hourly wage of formal sector workers by industry  iw  is estimated by 
assuming that the employees work 4.33 weeks per month: 
33.4

i
i
i
h
Y
w ;  
 Assuming production equals income, the total value of production foregone due to 
strikes is estimated as the product of work hours lost and mean hourly wage, i.e. 
ii wH  ; 
  GVA had strikes not happened would be derived as the sum of the GVA as it is (as 
released on the Quarterly Bulletin of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB)) and 
the total value of production foregone due to strikes  ii wH  .  
 
The same two composite strike indicators done by Van der Velden & Visser (2006) as 
mentioned earlier will be derived, but instead of merely presenting the trend of these 
indicators over time, this study would take one step further by examining their relationship 
with business cycle indicators, real GDP growth and inflation rate. The two indicators are 
derived as follows (Van der Velden & Visser, 2006:67-70), by using the data from both the 
1970-1998 ILO labour database and the abovementioned Annual Industrial Action Reports: 
 Indicator (I): 100






D
D
S
S
N
N
I tttt , where t = year, N = number of strikes, S = 
number of workers involved in strikes, D = number of work days lost due to strikes; 
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 Indicator (II): 
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t , where W= labour force number. 
 
The other two indicators would not be looked at, because of the criticisms about the choice of 
base year having a huge impact on the indices. The main problem with using these indices is 
that the results mainly depend on the base year that is chosen (Van der Velden & Visser, 
2006:70). The authors choose 1920 and 1970 as the base year once computing the Galambos-
Evans index and found that the results differ when using these years. The results indicated 
that when 1920 were used as the base year the year 1970 peaked and vice versa happened 
when 1970 were used (Van der Velden & Visser, 2006:70). This showed that the Galambos-
Evans index is not an effective way to calculate an index, because the outcome depends on 
the chosen base year. On the other hand, Van Kooten tried to find a solution to Knowles’s 
criticism of the Galambos-Evans Index by dividing the frequency (N) by the workforce (W). 
The Van Kooten index provided a solution to Knowles problem (van der Velden & Visser, 
2006:70). Nonetheless, base year dependency was still a problem. Upon conducting the 
annual average for the entire period using Van Kooten’s calculation as the base year (Van der 
Velden & Visser, 2006:70), this problem was officially solved. Therefore, this adjusted Van 
Kooten’s index will be used for this study.  
 
The final part of the empirical analysis conducts a multivariate econometric analysis on the 
two strike composite indices for 1970-2014. Each variable is regressed on the following 
explanatory variables: 
 Business cycle coincident indicator (CI). If strikes are pro-cyclical, this explanatory 
variable would have a positive coefficient. Pro-cyclical strikes imply that the demands 
of trade unions (e.g. higher wages and better working conditions) are more likely to 
be met. 
 A dummy variable that is equal to 1 for the years when there were significant changes 
in labour legislation (refer to Schoeman et al., 2010: 280)
4
, for instance, the 
abolishment of influx control in 1986, implementation of the new LRA in 1995 and 
the implementation of the Skills Development Act in 1999. It is expected that this 
                                                          
4
 This dummy variable is equal to 1 in the following years, 1973-1975, 1979, 1981, 1986, 1988, 1991-1993, 
1995-2000, and 2002. 
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dummy variable would have a positive coefficient, because it was based on important 
historical occasions or regulations that happened in the South African labour market.  
A value of 1 was given to such an occasion or legislation if it had a positive outcome 
for labour as a production factor. Nearly, all of the institutional improvements after 
1973 supported labour as a production factor. 
 Real interest rate: there is a positive relationship between real interest rate and strikes, 
because if real interest rate increases it will be too costly to loan real capital, the 
demand for labour will than increase and this will lead to a rise in strike incidences as 
workers are in a more advantaged position. 
 A dummy variable that is equal to 1 for 1995-2014. With the advent of democracy 
and the new LRA in 1995, it is argued that there should be a sustained decline in 
strike activity, and hence the dummy variable should be associated with a negative 
sign. A number of analysts suggest that a decline in strike incidences is due to the 
amended Labour Relations Act of 1995 (from 2003 Industrial Action Report, DoL, 
2003:2). According to the 2003 Industrial Action Report these analysts argue that 
improving the measures of strike disputes create greater expectedness concerning the 
bargaining process and this has led to a continued decrease in strike events. Improving 
strike dispute procedures also displayed various issues such as retrenchment and 
firing workers which were formerly considered as major strike causes (Department of 
Labour, 2003:2).  
 
3.3 Data 
The data that was used in this study was obtained from dependable sources. When examining 
the economic impact of industrial action in South Africa, an empirical study was done using 
nationally representative annual data from 2003-2014 Industrial Action Reports by the DoL. 
These reports provide information on the number of work stoppage incidents, working days 
lost, work hours lost and causes of strikes in 1999-2014. Regarding the industrial action data 
before 1999, it is not publicly available. However, the International Labour Organisation’s 
ILOSTAT database contains information on the following data in 1970-1998 by broad 
industry category: number of strikes (N), number of workers involved (S) and total work days 
lost (D). These data would be used (by ‘appending’ them with the 1999-2014 DoL data) for 
the forthcoming time-series econometric analysis. 
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Information on mean hourly wage in 2004-2014 is derived with the aid of Statistics South 
Africa’s QESs, before total earnings foregone could be derived. Furthermore, data on the 
number of formal sector employees is needed before time-loss ratios could be derived. The 
former information could be obtained from the 1999 OHS, 2000-2007 LFSs and 2008-2014 
QLFSs. Finally, the Quarterly Bulletins of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) include 
information on the various macroeconomic variables to be used for the econometric analysis 
(business cycle indicator, real interest rate, gross value added by industry). 
 
3.4 Limitations 
One drawback of the study is that, due to the short duration of the availability of the detailed 
industrial action statistics (comprehensive data on strikes is only available for 16 years, 
namely 1999-2014), it is not possible to conduct thorough robust econometric analysis, as 
extended time-series data are only available for three strike-related variables in the ILO 
labour database (for the years 1970-1998): (1) number of strikes; (2) number of workers 
involved in the strikes; (3) total amount of working days lost as a result of industrial action. 
The other drawback is that there are no worker-level and/or firm-level surveys conducted on 
strikes in South Africa, therefore it is not possible to conduct an empirical analysis as 
discussed in the review of international studies in Section 2.5.2. 
 
Wilkonson & Chiumia (2013) highlight some concerns on whether the estimates on the 
economic cost of strikes are accurate or not. The director of the Centre for Economics 
Journalism in Africa, Reg Rumney stated the readers should be cautious of the estimated loss 
figures on the estimated cost of strikes, because he implied these figures are simply a 
“guesstimate”. Levy, states that even labour experts are unable to accurately estimate the cost 
of strikes and there are various losses that must be considered both indirectly and directly. 
Russel, also agreed to these statements made by Rumney and Levy, that these quoted 
numbers are merely estimations used to demonstrate the industry’s concerns. Moreover, the 
social cost relating to strikes is significantly important. The impact of strike incidences on 
employees and the wider communities is important, because in these communities there is 
zero economic activity during the durations of strikes (Naryshkine). When estimating the cost 
of strikes to many factors must be considered, both social and economic cost must be taken 
into consideration in order to accurately estimate the cost of strikes. To conclude, it is not 
always easy to estimate the economic costs (and even benefits) of strikes accurately. 
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3.5  Conclusion  
This chapter discussed the research methodology that was undertaken in this study, which 
was used to examine the impact of industrial action upon the economy. The empirical data 
used for the study was clearly outlined to indicate the validity of the research. Finally, this 
study would not conduct the highly sophisticated SAM and CGE analysis, as these 
complicated modelling techniques fall beyond the scope of this study. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will first present detailed descriptive statistics on industrial action activities in 
each broad industry to find out which sector is mostly responsible for causing strike activities 
to be high in each year. Then the results of the static analysis on the total earnings foregone 
due to strike activities will be discussed for the period between 2004 and 2014. Afterwards, 
the earnings foregone as a proportion of GVA during the period will be derived, before 
showing what the total GDP and economic growth would have been without the impact of 
strikes. Lastly, a simple correlation analysis will be conducted between the strike data and 
macro-economic variables such as the inflation rate, the real GDP growth rate and the 
number of work days foregone as a result of strikes, followed by an econometric relationship 
between strikes and business cycles in 1970-2014. 
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
4.2.1 A brief history of the South African trade union movement  
In 1910 the union of South Africa excluded African workers from taking part in any formal 
policial expressions. Afterwards, various laws were passed that would deleteriously effect the 
labour market outcome (Bhorat, Naidoo & Yu, 2014:2). The Mines and Works Act of 1911 
set aside skilled mining jobs only for whites, whereas the 1913 Land Act banned Africans 
from possessing any land in selected ‘white’ areas and Africans were only able to live as 
‘reserves’, in certain areas. Africans only accounted for seven per cent of the total land area 
in the country. Conversely, African workers were forced into low-remuneration industries 
and careers as a result of Pass Laws which curtailed the free movement of African labour 
(Van der Berg and Bhorat 1999; Woolard, 2001). Consequently, the labour market was 
regarded as a strong racial division of labour that would carry on for many years to come.  
 
The government created a ‘floating’ job bar in 1960 in order to meet the increasing demand 
for skilled labour.  The white-skilled jobs were split into two when the ‘floating’ job bar was 
implemented, where African employees were only permitted to carry out the less-skilled part 
of a job, and the White employees the more skilled part without undermining the laws of 
apartheid. The African workforce received a conditional labour market mobility, which was 
desperately needed for a fast-growing economy (Van der Berg & Bhorat, 1999; Woolard, 
2001).   
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In the early 1970s with the rise of inflation and persistantly low wages, more strike incidents 
by African employees were based on wage demands. Pressure on the government started to 
increase further in the 1970s from several sources, such as a decrease in economic growth, 
the implementation of the 1974 international trade sanctions, and the 1976 important uprising 
of black youth in Soweto. Therefore, significant social and economic instability were 
generated as a result of the job reservation policy, trade union regstration, and collective 
bargaining  systems, which operated in the favour of white employees in South Africa (Van 
der Berg & Bhorat, 1999).  
 
The 1973 wildcat strikes were recognised as a watershed incident in the country’s histrical 
labour movement, and this event forced the government and employers to reconsider their 
methods to industrial relations. The industrial Conciliation Act of 1979 represents an 
important turning point in the black trade union movement. It indicated the formal legal 
acknowledgment of this rapidly increasing movement, signifying the ambitions and demands 
of black employees (Bhorat, Naidoo & Yu, 2014:3). In the mid-1980s trade unions became  a 
vital economic and political force against the apartheid regime. The black trade union 
movement was at the centre of the political fight against apartheid in South Africa. Industries 
that have black trade unions, forced other employers’ relations to approve their merger into a 
national bargaining council. Conversely, other industries that did not have any bargaining 
councils, were approached by large black trade unions and they effectively managed to porch 
the establishment of a national bargaining council for such industries (Godfrey et al. 2010). 
This paved the way to a more centralized collective bargaining from the 1990s onward. 
 
In South Africa trade union movement plays a significant role in the struggle for democracy. 
Trade union movement in South Africa has also been indissolubly linked to the anti-apartheid 
movement. The abolition of influx control was ultimately achieved in 1986, this added 
stimulus to the already strong labour movement that was provided by the black trade unions 
in the late 1970s. The goals of the trade union movement was reinforced by the aims of the 
wide-ranging anti-apartheid movement, along with a non-racial, democratic society, and with 
particular aims to improve the working conditions of all employees (Bhorat, Naidoo & Yu, 
2014:4). Hence, all these developments, together with the post-apartheid amendments to 
labour regulations stimulated the registration of trade unions in all industries. This paved the 
way for an extensive growth in the number of trade unions and unionized employees ever 
since 1994.   
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4.2.2 Extent of unionization 
Figure 7 shows that while there was an upward trend on the number of unionized formal 
sector employees (increasing from 2.59 million in 1997 to 3.86 million in 2014), a downward 
trend on the unionization rate (the proportion of formal sector workers being trade union 
members) took place during the same period as this percentage dropped from 40.55% to 
35.33%. 
 
Figure 7: Number and proportion of unionized formal sector employees, 1999-2014 
 
Source: Own calculations using OHS 1997-1999, LFS 2000-2007, QLFS 2008-2014 data. 
 
Figure 8: Average unionization rate by industry, 1997-2014 
 
Source: Own calculations using OHS 1997-1999, LFS 2000-2007, QLFS 2008-2014 data. 
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Figure 8 reflects the average unweighted unionization rate by industry
5
 from 1999 to 2014. 
During the 16-year period under study, on average, mining is the industry with the highest 
proportion of workers who are trade union members (76.76%), followed by the Community 
Services industry (57.91%). In fact, these are the only two industry categories with the 
average unionization rate above 50%. 
 
4.2.3 Number and nature of industrial action incidents  
Figure 9 illustrates the total number of strike incidents in South Africa from 1999 to 2014. 
The year 2002 had the lowest number of strike incidents (47 in total). It increased to 62 in 
2003 before dropping to 49 in 2004. This number abruptly increased to 102 in 2005 before a 
continuous downward trend took place until 2009. An upward trend took place in 2011-2013, 
with the number peaking at 114 in 2013, before dropping to 88 in 2014. 
 
Figure 9: Number of industrial actions, 1999-2014 
 
Source: Own calculations using the data from the 2003-2014 Industrial Action Reports. 
 
Figure 10 extends to the analysis of Figure 9 by adding the results of 1970-1998 using the 
ILO labour database. The number of strikes abruptly increased to nearly 400 in 1973-1974; 
this was attributed to the wildcat strike
6
 in 1973 and it was seen as a defining moment in the 
labour market history of South Africa (Bhorat, Naidoo & Yu, and 2014:4). The number of 
                                                          
5
 This actually stands for the unweighted average of the annual unionisation rate for the period 1997-2014. For 
these annual statistics by industry, refer to Table A.1 in the Appendix. The same approach will be adopted in the 
forthcoming analysis when the ‘average unweighted’ results are presented. 
6
 A wildcat strike is a strike that is not controlled by a regular trade union, but, rather by an ad hoc working 
group mounting to a specific incident (Troskie, 1998:56).  
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strikes suddenly increased to 1 148 in 1987 compared to only 389 in 1985. In 1987, six 
million workdays were lost as a result of a lengthy and huge strike in the mining industry. 
Nine people lost their lives during this strike and 500 strikers were wounded. After, these 
incident workers from the public sector started to assemble. Moreover, in 1987 an industrial 
action by the South African Transport Services of 18 000 employees, originally started with 
the firing of a worker which later intensified into a huge clash between the South African 
Railways and Harbour Workers’ Union (SARHWU) and the government  (Oberholzer 
1992:152). Furthermore, the number of strikes peaked at 1 324 in 1997, before an abrupt 
downward trend took place in 1998-1999. Finally, it is noticeable that the number of strikes 
in 1999-2014 was much lower compared with the earlier years. 
 
Figure 10: Number of industrial actions, 1970-2014  
 
Source: Own calculations using the data from the ILO labour database and the 2003-2014 
Industrial Action Reports. 
 
The average industrial share of strikes between 1999 and 2014 is presented in Figure 11 (for 
detailed results by industry in each year, refer to Table A.2 in the Appendix). On average, the 
Community Services (20.82%), Manufacturing (20.52%) and Mining (15.98%) industries 
accounted for the highest share of strike incidences during the 16-year period under study.  
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Figure 11: Average percentage share of industrial actions by industry, 1999-2014 
 
Source: Own calculations using the data from the 2003-2014 Industrial Action Reports. 
 
Tables A.5 to A.7 in the Appendix provide additional information on the nature of strikes. 
First, Table A.5 shows that the majority of strikes (the average proportion being 53.22%) was 
related to the category “strike company only”; Table A.6 indicates that the majority of the 
strikes lasted between 1-10 days (the average proportion was 32.91% and 25.37%, for the “1-
5 days” and “6-10 days” categories respectively). Finally, as far as strikes by size of 
establishment is concerned, until 2010, the share of “1000+” was relatively more dominant in 
most of the years, but in 2011-2014, the majority of strikes rather took place in smaller 
establishments (see Table A.7). In fact, in these four years, the firms with less than 300 
workers accounted for about 60% of the strikes (see the last four columns of the table). 
 
4.2.4 Number of workers involved 
Figure 12 presents the total number of workers involved in strikes in 1999-2014. The highest 
number of workers involved in strikes occurred in 2000 (1.14 million). This year was 
associated with strikes concerning worker grievances such as employer requirements for staff 
to be multi-skilled, job grading, productivity targets and perceived or real discrimination 
practices (IOL, 2001). After 2000, this number fluctuated between 0.07 million to 0.61 
million in 2001-2009, before abruptly rising to 1.19 million in 2010 as a result of the public 
sector strike that happened in July and August 2010. This number dropped to 0.20 million in 
2011, before decreasing further to 0.12 million in 2014.  
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Figure 12: Number of workers (million) involved in industrial actions, 1999-2014 
 
Source: Own calculations using the data from the 2003-2014 Industrial Action Reports. 
 
Figure 13 extends the above analysis by adding the 1970-1998 results from the ILO labour 
database. For these earlier years, it can be seen that the number of workers involved in strikes 
was particularly high in 1986 and 1987, due to the aforementioned wild cat strikes. Finally, 
Table A.8 in the Appendix shows the number of workers involved in strikes by industry in 
1999-2014, and it can be clearly seen that the Community Service industry accounted for a 
very high proportion of the workers involved in strikes in the two abrupt years (2000 and 
2010). 
 
Figure 13: Number of workers (million) involved in industrial actions, 1970-2014 
 
Source: Own calculations using the data from the ILO labour database and 2003-2014 
Industrial Action Reports. 
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The percentage of formal sector employees involved in strikes in 1999-2014 is showed in 
Figure 14, and it can be seen that this percentage has been quite unstable, ranging from as 
low as 0.89% in 2002 to 15.84% in 2000. Table A.10 in the Appendix presents the results by 
industry and it can be seen that this proportion was relatively higher for the Mining 
(especially in 2005, 2007, 2012 and 2013) and Community Services (especially in 2000 and 
2010) industries. 
 
Figure 14: Percentage of formal sector employees involved in industrial actions, 1999-
2014 
 
Source: Own calculations using the data from the 2003-2014 Industrial Action Reports. 
 
Figure 15: Average percentage of formal sector employees involved in industrial actions 
by industry, 1999-2014 
 
Source: Own calculations using the data from the 2003-2014 Industrial Action Reports. 
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The average unweighted percentage of formal sector workers who participated in strikes by 
industry is presented in Figure 15 above. Over the 16-year period under study, this share was 
the highest in the Mining industry (19.24%), followed by the Community Services industry 
(9.60%).  
 
4.2.5 Work hours lost 
Table A.11 in the Appendix shows the total absolute number of work hours lost due to strikes 
(the information is only available for 2003-2014); the results indicate that, in overall terms, 
the total work hours lost was the highest in 2010 (161.85 million hours), followed by 2014 
(109.82 million). The last row of the table shows that, on average, the total work hours lost 
was the highest in the Community Services industry (18.95 million) and Mining industry 
(15.79 million). On the other hand, Figure 16 illustrates the average percentage share of work 
hours lost due to strikes by industry, and it can be seen that the Mining industry accounted for 
the highest share (37.76%), followed by the Community Service industry (26.15%). The 
detailed results by industry in each year could be found in Table A.12 in the Appendix.   
 
Figure 16: Average percentage share of work hours lost due to industrial actions of each 
industry, 2003-2014 
 
Source: Own calculations using the data from the 2003-2014 Industrial Action Reports. 
 
4.2.6 Work days lost 
The number of working days lost due to strikes points towards the total number of employees 
who took part in the strike or lockout multiplied by the duration of the industrial action. First, 
Figure 17 presents the 1999-2014 results using the DoL data. The more significant strikes 
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during the period would be reviewed here. The number of working days lost increased from 
0.92 million in 2003 to 1.29 in 2004, mainly due to a strike incidence in the North West 
(Department of Labour, 2004:2; 2005:3) in the latter year. In 2005 the number of working 
days lost more than doubled to 2.63 million in 2005; in this year, the first nationwide gold 
miners’ strike took place for the first time in 18 years, while the South African Airways 
(SAA) workers were on strike for a long time (Department of Labour, 2006: 1) 
 
Figure 17: Number of work days lost (million) due to industrial actions, 1999-2014 
 
Source: Own calculations using the data from the 2003-2014 Industrial Action Reports. 
 
The number of work days lost increased further to 4.15 million in 2006: six larger stoppages 
took place in the country in this year: the contract national strikes, the security guards strike, 
Shoprite/Checkers strike, Pick’n Pay strike, Sun International strike, and the labour dispute at 
Sasko. These six disputes represented nearly 90 per cent of total work days lost in 2006. The 
largest public service strike in the history of South Africa’s labour relations took place in 
2007 (Department of Labour, 2008: 1-2), as the public service unions and the government 
were unable to reach a wage agreement before the second half of 2007 commenced. Hence, 
the workers had lunch-hour pickets in their respective workplaces, before embarking on a 
one-day strike on the 25th of May. A long strike (lasting 25 days) eventually took place in 
early June. This strike alone led to 8.1 million work days lost (representing 85 per cent of 
total work days lost in 2007).  
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The highest amount of working days lost was recorded in 2010 (20.67 million). This outcome 
was due to a public sector strike during July and August of that year, with more than 1 
million strike participants (Department of Labour, 2011: viii). This number decreased 
significantly by 86.4% to 2.81 million in 2011; this huge decline can be described by the fall 
of strike incidences in the public sector with the formal acceptance of a wage agreement 
(Department of Labour, 2012:6). 
 
While the work hours and work days lost in 2012 (3.31 million days) were, relatively 
speaking, not particularly high, the country experienced violent and bloody industrial actions 
in the mining, transport and agricultural industries during the last three months of the year. 
Work hours and work days lost were most prominent in the mining industry (Tables 6 and 7), 
with most striking workers coming from the National Union of Mineworkers (Department of 
Labour, 2013: 2). Finally, 2014 was nominated by numerous national strikes in the mining 
industry. These national strikes had a big impact on the South African economy as most of 
these strikes were related to wage hike demands (Department of Labour, 2015: 3); these 
strikes eventually led to a huge 10.26 million work days lost. 
 
Figure 18: Number of work days lost (million) due to industrial actions, 1970-2014 
 
Source: Own calculations using the data from the ILO labour database and 2003-2014 
Industrial Action Reports. 
 
Figure 18 above extends the analysis by adding the 1970-1998 ILO data. For these older 
years, the number of working days lost as a result of strikes was particularly high in 1987  
(refer to the earlier discussion). Since there are no Industrial Action Reports for the years 
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1970 to 1998 we can only discuss the big historical strike events in South Africa to a certain 
extent. Wildcat strikes were taking place from 1979 and trade unions realized that they are 
losing control over employees during this time (Homma & Hoeksema, 1979). Number of 
strikes increased from 101 in 1979 to 1 148 in 1987 (Oberholzer 1992:152). The number of 
working days lost in the mining sector in 1987 was the greatest due to long strike durations 
(were almost 6 million workdays were lost). After the 1994, election there was a decrease in 
the strike frequency; this was due to a decrease of activities in the mining and manufacturing 
industries. Moreover, wage disagreements in both the private and public sector, such as the 
police, municipal and health services, created a new wave of strike disputes from 1996 to 
1999 (Bendix 2001:83; Finnemore & Van Rensburg 2002:374).  
 
Table A.15 in the Appendix shows the number of work days lost by industry in 1999-2014; 
this number was particularly high in the Mining industry in 2014 (9.61 million) as well as the 
Community Services industry in 2007 (8.16 million) and 2010 (18.87 million). Figure 19 
shows the average unweighted industrial share of work days lost. The results indicate that this 
share was the highest in the Community Services industry (34.99%), followed by Mining 
(28.16%) and Manufacturing (13.48%). The detailed results in each year are presented in 
Table A.16 in the Appendix: the share was the highest in the Mining industry in 7 years (this 
share was as high as 82.43% in 2012 and 93.64% in 2014), while this share was the highest in 
the Community Services industry in another 7 years (it was the highest in 2010 at 91.25%).  
 
Figure 19: Average percentage share of work days lost due to industrial actions of each 
industry, 1999-2014 
 
Source: Own calculations using the data from the 2003-2014 Industrial Action Reports. 
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4.2.7 Time-loss ratios
7
 
The time-loss ratio indicates the number of work days lost as a result of strike incidences per 
1 000 workers (Jacobs & Yu, 2013:6). This is a benchmark indicator and we use it to 
compare industrial action across various countries, and industries. The time-loss ratio is also 
the most frequently used indicator and it provides a very reliable outcome when comparing 
industrial action in different countries and industries.  
 
The overall time-loss ratios in 1999-2014 in South Africa are presented in Figure 20. 
Focusing on the ratios derived by only considering the formal sector workers, in general, the 
time-loss ratio decreased continuously from 1999, before an upward trend took place between 
2002 and 2007. The ratio reached 1 051 in 2007. After decreasing dramatically in 2008, it 
increased again and reached 2 135 by 2010. The ratio decreased abruptly to 278 in 2011 
before rising again to 941 in 2014.  
 
Figure 20: Time-loss ratios, 1999-2014 
 
Source: Own calculations using the data from the 2003-2014 Industrial Action Reports. 
 
Figure 21 extends the analysis of Figure 20 by adding the 1970-1998 results using the ILO 
labour database. It can be seen that the time-loss ratio was extremely high in 1987, due to the 
abovementioned 1986-1987 wild cat strikes. Furthermore, the time-loss ratio of South Africa 
                                                          
7
 This indicator internationally compares strike activities in different countries. The ratio indicates which 
country is susceptible to strikes when compared to other countries. 
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compared to other upper-middle income countries is presented in Figure 22. South Africa is 
the country with highest time-loss ratio when compared to these countries: the time-loss ratio 
was very high in South Africa (322.9 in 2012 and 940.5 in 2014), but it was very low in 
countries like Russia (0.1 in 2014) Mauritius (1.5 in 2012) and Turkey (12.0 in 2013). Even 
though the 2014 Peru time-loss ratio (198.3) was higher than the South African ratio in 2008 
(51.8), it was still very low compared with what happened in South Africa in 2012 and 2014. 
 
Figure 21: Time-loss ratios (considering formal sector employees only), 1970-2014 
 
Source: Own calculations using the data from the ILO labour database and 2003-2014 
Industrial Action Reports. 
 
Figure 22: Time-loss ratios, South Africa vs. other upper-middle income countries 
 
Source: Own calculations using ILO labour database. 
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Figure 23 presents the average unweighted time-loss ratios by industry in 1999-2014 (the 
detailed results by industry in each year could be found in Tables A.17 and Table A.18 in the 
Appendix). The Mining industry was associated with the highest average time-loss ratio 
(about 2 600), followed by the Community Services industry (close to 1 000). This ratio was 
the lowest in the Agriculture, Electricity and Finance industries. 
 
Figure 23: Average time-loss ratios by industry, 1999-2014 
 
Source: Own calculations using the data from the 2003-2014 Industrial Action Reports. 
 
4.2.8 Other results 
Figure 24 illustrates the percentage of working days lost due wages, bonus and other 
compensation (WBC). The number of labour days lost by employees due to WBC was the 
main reason for strike incidences and it reached its peak in 2010 at 98.8%. Since 2010, the 
percentage of working days lost due to WBC has decrease significantly from a high of 98.8% 
to 74.6% in 2013. However, in 2014 strike incidences increased significantly from 74.6% in 
2013 to 98.4% in 2014. In addition, ‘working conditions (e.g. hours, health and safety) and 
‘socio-economic and political conditions’ are the causes accounting for the second (about 
6%) and third (5.5%) highest shares of working days lost respectively. 
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Figure 24: Percentage of work days lost due to wages, bonus and other compensation as 
the principle cause, 1999-2014 
 
Source: Own calculations using the data from the 2003-2014 Industrial Action Reports. 
 
Table 1 reflects the top 5 trade unions accounting for the greatest share of working days lost. 
The most working days lost in 2006 were caused by trade unions such as SATAWU and 
SACCAWU who started most of the strike incidents compared to NUM in 2005. The 
working days lost were round about 1.89 million (45.6%) in stoppages that were fully backed 
by SATAWU, whereas in 2005 SATAWU accounted for approximately 0.55 million (21.1%) 
working days lost due to related disputes. SACCAWU resulted in the second highest strike 
action with 1.31 million (14.6%) working days lost in 2006.  
 
SATAWU dominated the number of workdays lost in 2013 with 25.2%. This was due to the 
national bus strike, where workers decided to strike for an 18% increase in wages. In contrast 
NUM and AMCU had more member involvement in strike incidences in 2012. NUM had 
fewer strike participating members (7.8%) in 2013 compared to 2012 (25.2%). This decrease 
in membership participation could be due to workers not receiving any wages when 
participating in strikes or they were scared of losing their jobs (Department of Labour, 
2013:21).  
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Table 1: Top 5 trade unions accounting for the greatest share of working days lost, 
2004-2014 
Source: Own calculations using the data from the 2003-2014 Industrial Action Reports. 
AMCU:  Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) 
BAWUSA: Building and Allied Workers Union of South Africa 
BCAWU: Building Construction and Allied Workers Union 
DENOSA: Democratic Nursing Organisation of South Africa 
FAWU:  Food and Allied Workers Union 
HOSPERSA:  Health and Other Service Personnel Trade Union of South Africa  
NATU:  National Teachers Union South Africa 
NEHAWU:  National Education Health and Allied Workers Union  
NUM:   National Union of Mineworkers  
NUMSA:  National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa  
NUPSAW:  National Union of Public Service and Allied Workers  
POPCRU: Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union 
PSA:   Public Servants Association of South Africa  
SACCAWU:  South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union  
SACTWU:  Southern African Clothing and Textile Workers’ Union  
SADTU:   South African Democratic Teachers Union  
SAMWU:  South African Municipal Workers Union  
SATAWU:  South African Transport and Allied Workers Union  
TAWU:   Transport and Allied Workers Union 
TOWU:  Transport & Omnibus Workers Union 
 
In 2014, AMCU, NUMSA and NUM dominated in the number of strike participating 
members, in comparison to SATAWU in 2013. The number of working days lost for each of 
these three trade union members were 92.2%, 2.59% and 1.40% respectively. These strikes 
can be related to the mining sector in which AMCU members took part in the work stoppage 
to demand a R12 500 monthly wage increase. Moreover, NUMSA members demanded a 
 No.1 No.2 No.3 No.4 No.5 Other Total 
2004 NUM 
33.0 
SATAWU 
17.9 
NEHAWU 
17.8 
PSA 
7.4 
NUMSA 
6.9 
 
17.0 
 
100.0 
2005 NUM 
35.2 
SATAWU 
21.0 
SACCAWU 
12.1 
SAMWU 
8.1 
FAWU 
5.3 
 
18.3 
 
100.0 
2006 SATAWU 
41.5 
SACCAWU 
14.6 
TAWU 
13.8 
FAWU 
7.8 
NUM 
5.0 
 
17.3 
 
100.0 
2007 NEHAWU 
8.6 
HOSPERSA 
8.6 
NUPSAW 
8.5 
POPCRU 
8.5 
NATU 
8.5 
 
57.3 
 
100.0 
2008 SAMWU 
33.0 
NUM 
22.7 
SATAWU 
17.1 
NUMSA 
9.1 
SACCAWU 
2.8 
 
15.3 
 
100.0 
2009 NUM 
35.2 
SACTWU 
14.5 
SATAWU 
8.7 
BCAWU 
8.7 
SAMWU 
6.1 
 
26.8 
 
100.0 
2010 NEHAWU 
18.7 
PSA 
16.4 
SADTU 
16.3 
POPCRU 
10.9 
DENOSA 
5.5 
 
32.2 
 
100.0 
2011 SATAWU 
 
44.6 
SOLIDARIY 
UNION 
24.0 
NUMSA 
 
9.2 
NUM 
 
5.9 
SAMWU 
 
4.7 
 
 
11.6 
 
 
100.0 
2012 NUM 
25.2 
NUMSA 
3.3 
FAWU 
3.0 
SATAWU 
1.2 
BAWUSA 
1.2 
 
66.1 
 
100.0 
2013 SATAWU 
25.2 
NUM 
17.4 
NUMSA 
16.3 
TOWU 
7.5 
AMCU 
7.3 
 
26.3 
 
100.0 
2014 AMCU 
92.2 
NUMSA 
2.6 
NUM 
1.4 
SAMWU 
0.7 
FAWU 
0.5 
 
2.6 
 
100.0 
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wage increase of 12% in the steel and engineering industry strike that was caused by metal 
workers.  
 
4.2.9 Conclusion 
The analysis of Section 4.2 highlights the following key findings: 
 Unionization increased in absolute terms but decreased in relative terms in 1999-
2014; 
 Number of strikes was abruptly high in 1987 and 1997, and this number was much 
lower since 1999; 
 Number of workers involved in strikes was particularly higher in 2000 and 2010 
(exceeding 1 million); 
 Mining industry accounted for more than one-third of total work hours lost due to 
strikes in 2003-2014, followed by Community Services and Manufacturing industries; 
 Number of work days lost due to strikes was abruptly high in 1987, 2007, 2010 and 
2014 (exceeding 5 million); Community Services industry accounted for the greatest 
average share (above one-third) of work days lost due to strikes in 1999-2014, 
followed by Mining and Manufacturing industries; 
 Time-loss ratios were particularly high in 1987, 2007, 2010 and 2014; 
 Time-loss ratio in South Africa was much higher, when compared with the ratios of 
other upper-middle income countries in similar years; 
 Wages, bonus and other compensation was the primary cause of work days lost; 
 NUM and SATAWAU are the two most active trade unions accounting for the 
highest share of work days lost. 
 
4.3 Further analysis 
This section will first focus on a simple static analysis that would be conducted to estimate 
the impact of strike incidences on the GVA. Afterwards, the total earnings forgone would be 
empirically estimated due to industrial actions, before briefly investigating the econometric 
relationship between strikes, labour market indicators and economic growth. The results 
obtained in this study are preliminary and it should be inferred with caution. This is as a 
result of the limitations of the data (as mentioned earlier) in which it is not possible to 
demeanor a thorough econometric analysis.  
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4.3.1 Value of production foregone due to strikes 
The nominal mean hourly wage of formal sector employees by industry  iw  is derived in 
Table 2 with the aid of data on mean monthly income  iY  and mean usual weekly work hours 
 ih by industry, as seen in Tables A.3 and A.4 respectively in Appendix. The total value of 
production foregone due to strikes in each industry is estimated as the product of work hours 
lost, based on the assumption that production equals income (refer to Table A.11 in the 
Appendix), and hourly wage as previously derived in Table 2, that is, .ii wH    
 
The total value of production foregone is presented in Table 3 in constant 2010 prices; this 
value was the highest at R12 406 million in the year 2010, followed by 2014 and 2007 with 
R7 364 million and R3 757 million respectively. In observing the results it is clear that the 
value foregone was the highest in mining industry in 2014 (7 003 million), followed by the 
community service industry in 2007 (3 228 million), and 2010 (11 745 million).  
 
Table 2: Nominal mean hourly wage of formal sector employees by industry, 2004-2014  
Year [A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G] [H] [I] 
2004 4.94 31.50 32.30 78.07 20.94 25.03 48.52 33.61 47.13 
2005 5.59 31.86 32.18 67.42 21.05 23.21 47.86 35.84 44.80 
2006 6.40 35.18 34.95 74.60 24.82 26.00 50.17 43.54 48.99 
2007 7.30 39.93 37.97 82.48 27.63 28.39 54.29 48.18 53.81 
2008 8.24 48.18 43.17 96.01 31.86 31.71 57.64 51.88 60.05 
2009 9.03 55.06 48.62 112.06 38.15 34.40 65.79 57.60 66.16 
2010 9.92 60.35 55.13 126.41 47.12 39.12 73.14 64.58 77.94 
2011 10.90 68.20 60.63 133.24 50.26 42.08 79.19 71.54 80.61 
2012 11.18 74.76 66.51 145.69 56.58 44.56 84.72 74.57 91.53 
2013 13.91 81.52 72.38 162.06 61.97 50.91 91.07 82.17 98.37 
2014 17.29 84.55 76.83 177.72 66.55 55.71 99.24 87.61 105.55 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
Note: [A]: Agriculture  [B]: Mining  [C]: Manufacturing  
[D]: Electricity  [E]: Construction  [F]: Wholesale & Retail  
[G]: Transport  [H]: Finance  [I]: Community services 
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Table 3: Total value of production foregone due to strikes by industry (R in million, 
2010 prices), 2004-2014 
Year [A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G] [H] [I] Total 
2004 3 583 43 0 0 1 28 15 260 933 
2005 7 1 008 102 0 2 45 249 4 189 1 605 
2006 3 61 76 21 0 364 66 637 584 1 813 
2007 1 256 249 0 6 3 9 5 3 228 3 757 
2008 1 42 25 0 4 2 51 8 65 198 
2009 2 172 118 0 90 8 123 3 108 624 
2010 0 70 167 4 1 99 310 11 11 745 12 406 
2011 12 1 695 537 0 8 88 30 1 872 3 241 
2012 12 1 229 92 1 4 5 81 1 73 1 497 
2013 8 237 221 2 108 20 271 12 103 982 
2014 3 7 003 251 18 6 15 15 2 50 7 364 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
 
Table 4
8
 illustrates the total value of production foregone as proportion of the GVA. In 
viewing the economy as a whole, the GVA proportion was the lowest in 2008 (0.0082%), but 
it increased significantly in 2010 (0.4973%). However, the results indicate that this GVA 
proportion by industry surpassed 1% in two years over the whole period from 2005-2014, in 
the mining industry in 2014 (3.0781%) and community service industry in 2010 (2.1230%).  
 
Table 4: Total value of production foregone due to strikes as proportion of gross value 
added by industry, 2004-2014 
Year [A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G] [H] [I] Total 
2004 0.0059 0.2387 0.0137 0.0005 0.0000 0.0003 0.0153 0.0039 0.0582 0.0343 
2005 0.0117 0.4084 0.0309 0.0007 0.0026 0.0143 0.1287 0.0009 0.0407 0.0607 
2006 0.0061 0.0249 0.0216 0.0307 0.0001 0.1091 0.0323 0.1410 0.1212 0.0806 
2007 0.0012 0.1052 0.0671 0.0007 0.0077 0.0009 0.0043 0.0010 0.6386 0.1496 
2008 0.0009 0.0181 0.0067 0.0000 0.0050 0.0005 0.0225 0.0015 0.0123 0.0082 
2009 0.0032 0.0787 0.0348 0.0001 0.0949 0.0021 0.0544 0.0006 0.0199 0.0263 
2010 0.0000 0.0304 0.0465 0.0057 0.0009 0.0266 0.1351 0.0021 2.1230 0.4973 
2011 0.0186 0.7412 0.1452 0.0000 0.0081 0.0228 0.0125 0.0001 0.1513 0.1299 
2012 0.0175 0.5534 0.0243 0.0015 0.0044 0.0012 0.0333 0.0001 0.0123 0.0605 
2013 0.0114 0.1027 0.0581 0.0036 0.1047 0.0049 0.1084 0.0021 0.0169 0.0374 
2014 0.0043 3.0781 0.0658 0.0265 0.0061 0.0036 0.0058 0.0003 0.0081 0.2708 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
 
Finally, Table 5 and 6 shows the annual real GVA growth rates with strikes and had strikes 
not happened, respectively and there was also one remarkable finding that occurred when 
looking at the results. By using the original real GVA figures as they are (as shown in Table 
                                                          
8
 The proportions derived in this table are estimated with the aid of the values in Table 2 by the equivalent GVA 
values in Table A.13.  
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5), from three out of the 10 years under study the mining industry had positive real GVA 
growth. On the other hand, had strikes not occurred, the mining industry would have only 
experience four years of positive real GVA growth. The mining industry experienced a 
negative real GVA growth of -1.41 % in 2014 when strikes took place, however had strikes 
not taken place the industry could have had a growth rate of 1.52% in this year.  
 
Table 5: Annual real gross value added growth by industry (%), 2005-2014 
Year [A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G] [H] [I] Total 
2005 2.81 1.03 6.20 5.35 11.92 7.05 5.29 5.71 4.16 5.12 
2006 -5.46 -0.59 6.44 3.42 10.44 5.96 5.12 9.64 3.70 5.17 
2007 2.98 -0.64 5.35 3.42 15.52 5.60 7.51 7.25 4.90 5.41 
2008 19.41 -5.33 2.32 -3.54 9.87 1.75 3.50 5.58 5.05 3.29 
2009 -1.89 -5.13 -10.63 -1.75 8.54 -1.12 -0.19 1.05 2.06 -1.43 
2010 -0.30 5.26 5.91 2.42 0.73 4.43 1.68 1.24 2.08 2.92 
2011 1.99 -0.74 3.03 1.53 0.43 4.08 3.46 4.25 4.13 3.21 
2012 1.76 -2.91 2.10 -0.36 2.58 3.95 2.42 2.98 2.76 2.24 
2013 3.65 3.96 0.82 -0.61 4.56 1.85 2.77 2.55 2.73 2.40 
2014 6.86 -1.41 0.11 -1.26 3.62 1.37 3.05 2.36 2.40 1.72 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
 
Table 6: Annual real gross value added growth industry had strikes not happened (%), 
2005-2014 
Year [A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G] [H] [I] Total 
2005 2.81 1.20 6.22 5.35 11.92 7.06 5.41 5.71 4.14 5.15 
2006 -5.47 -0.97 6.43 3.45 10.43 6.06 5.01 9.80 3.79 5.18 
2007 2.97 -0.56 5.40 3.38 15.53 5.48 7.48 7.10 5.44 5.49 
2008 19.41 -5.42 2.25 -3.54 9.87 1.75 3.52 5.58 4.40 3.13 
2009 -1.89 -5.07 -10.60 -1.75 8.64 -1.12 -0.16 1.05 2.07 -1.41 
2010 -0.30 5.21 5.92 2.42 0.64 4.45 1.76 1.24 4.23 3.41 
2011 2.01 -0.03 3.14 1.52 0.43 4.08 3.33 4.25 2.12 2.83 
2012 1.76 -3.09 1.97 -0.35 2.57 3.93 2.44 2.98 2.61 2.17 
2013 3.64 3.49 0.86 -0.61 4.66 1.86 2.84 2.55 2.73 2.38 
2014 6.85 1.52 0.11 -1.24 3.52 1.37 2.95 2.36 2.39 1.95 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
 
4.3.2 Econometric analysis 
The relationship between strikes and macroeconomic indicators are examined in this section. 
First, the trend in the two Van der Velden & Visser (VV) strike indices (refer to Section 3.2) 
are presented, before showing the coincident business cycle indicator. Afterwards, the trend 
in the real interest rate indicator is displayed, followed by a statistical relationship between 
the five macroeconomic indices. Lastly, a multivariate regression is presented on the strike 
composite indicators.  
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First, Figure 25 illustrates the trend between the two VV composite strike indicators from 
1970-2014. In general the two VV strike indices fluctuated significantly over the whole 
period. But, there are four years in which the VV strike indicators are particularly high when 
compared to the other years: 1987, 2007, 2010, and 2014. Therefore, these four years are 
added later in the regression analysis as dummy variables to account for the abrupt increases 
in strike incidences during these four years (refer back to Section 4.2 on why strikes were 
abruptly higher in these years).  
 
Figure 25: The two Van der Velden & Visser composite strike indices in log terms, 
1970-2014 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
 
Figure 26 shows that in general the coincident business cycle indicator shows an upward 
trend over the whole period which means the economy experience positive real growth over 
the 45-year period. However, there are some years in which the coincident indicator values 
decline and this point towards a recession. For instance, the decline in the early 1990s was 
due to the political instability caused by the Apartheid era and the international sanctions. 
The decline in the business cycle coincident indicator value between the periods of 1998 and 
1999 was triggered by the Asian Crisis. In 2009 the economy experienced a Global recession 
and this contributed to the decline of the coincident indicator value during that time. Finally, 
Figure 27 shows that in some of the earlier years the South African economy was associated 
with a negative real interest rate. The two years with the lowest real interest rate were 1974 (-
4.95%) and 1980 (-12.34%). But, since 1994 the economy has continuously experience 
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positive real interest rates, and this could be partly attributed to the implementation of 
inflation targeting by the SARB since 1999. 
 
Figure 26: Business cycle coincident indicator, 1970-2014  
 
Data source: Quarterly Bulletin of the South African Reserve Bank 
 
Figure 27: Real interest rate, 1970-2014 
  
Data source: Quarterly Bulletin of the South African Reserve Bank 
 
Table 7 below examines the correlation relationship between these five macroeconomic 
indices (2010:100): 
 Real gross domestic product (GDP); 
 Consumer price index (CPI); 
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 Business cycle: coincident indicator (CI); 
 Van der Velden & Visser (VV) strike indicator (I); 
 Van der Velden & Visser (VV) strike indicator (II);  
 
Table 7: Correlation coefficients between the five economic indicators, 1970-2014 
 Real GDP CPI Coincident 
indicator 
VV (I) VV(II) 
Real GDP 1.0000 0.9812 0.9760 0.3925 0.1509 
CPI  1.0000 0.9366 0.3687 0.1017 
Coincident 
indicator 
  1.0000 0.4263 0.2204 
VV(I)    1.0000 0.9282 
VV(II)     1.0000 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
 
There is a strong and positive correlation between the two VV indices with a correlation 
coefficient of 0.9282 as seen in Table 7. It appears that the VV (I) strike indicator has a 
stronger correlation with real GDP, CPI and CI indices in comparison to the VV (II) strike 
indicator. Moreover, the relationship between the VV (I) index and the business cycle 
coincident indicator (0.4263) is adequate and positive, and this implies that strikes are 
procyclical. Conversely, there is a positive and reasonable relationship between the VV (I) 
index and real GDP at a coefficient of 0.3925, and this relationship suggests that strikes are 
procyclical.  
 
By focusing on the VV(I) index, Table 8 illustrates the outcome of the Granger causality tests 
(with two lags), and it is clear from Table 8 that strikes might be procyclical, as the 
coincident indicator of the business cycle does Granger cause VV (I) index (at alpha = 1%). 
On the other hand, strikes could lead to inflation in the future, as the VV (I) index results in 
Granger cause CPI (at alpha = 5%).   
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Table 8: Pairwise Granger causality tests (lags = 2) 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Sample: 1970 2014 
Lags: 2 
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
  CPI does not Granger Cause COINCIDENT 43  8.6458  0.0008 
  COINCIDENT does not Granger Cause CPI  5.7450  0.0066 
  VV1 does not Granger Cause COINCIDENT 43  0.7468  0.4807 
  COINCIDENT does not Granger Cause VV1  7.7589  0.0015 
  VV1 does not Granger Cause CPI 43  4.0236  0.0260 
  CPI does not Granger Cause VV1  2.2083  0.1238 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
  
Finally, Table 9 presents four multivariate regressions on two strike composite indicators. 
The four explanatory variables for the log of indicator (I) and (II) are all statistically 
significant at 1%: the positive parameters of the business cycle coincident indicator in all 
regressions indicate that strikes for the whole period are procyclical; the changes in labour 
legislation dummy variables are positive, meaning these changes were associated with greater 
strike incidences; the economic transition dummy variable is negative in parameter, and this 
indicates a significant decline in strike incidences since 1995 due to the new LRA and the 
advent of democracy; the relationship between real interest rate and strikes is positive, and as 
a result of this, the workers would be in a better position to demand better wages and working 
conditions by initiating strikes.  
 
Finally, in regressions [B] and [D], four additional dummy variables were added to account 
for the years that have extremely high strike incidences (1987, 2007, 2010 and 2014 – refer to 
the detailed discussion in Section 4.2). It can be seen that after adding these four dummy 
variables, both the R-squared and adjusted R-squared increased (compared to regressions [A] 
and [C] respectively), but only the 2010 dummy was statistically significant. 
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Table 9: Multivariate econometric analysis on the two strike composite indicators 
 Dependent variable 
Log of indicator VV(I) Log of indicator VV(II) 
 [A] [B] [C] [D] 
Coincident indicator (-1) 0.0498
***
 
(0.0087) 
0.0444
***
 
(0.0088) 
0.0362
***
 
(0.0088) 
0.0298
***
 
(0.0088) 
Dummy: Changes in labour legislation (-1) 0.8305
***
 
(0.2267) 
0.8326
***
 
(0.2232) 
0.7037
***
 
(0.2303) 
0.6955
***
 
(0.2232) 
Dummy: Economic transition since 1995 (-1) -1.5114
***
 
(0.4039) 
-1.4233
***
 
(0.3992) 
-1.5158
***
 
(0.4102) 
-1.3975
***
 
(0.3992) 
Real interest rate (-2) 0.0889
***
 
(0.0267) 
0.0833
***
 
(0.0258) 
0.0669
**
 
(0.0271) 
0.0601
**
 
(0.0258) 
Dummy 1987  0.6200 
(0.6706) 
 0.7857 
(0.6706) 
Dummy 2007  0.7805 
(0.6616) 
 0.9373 
(0.6616) 
Dummy 2010  1.6659
**
 
(0.6552) 
 1.7045
***
 
(0.6552) 
Dummy 2014  0.2538 
(0.6800) 
 0.3393 
(0.6801) 
Constant 1.8704
***
 
(0.5706) 
2.163
***
 
(0.5706) 
1.8989
***
 
(0.5795) 
2.2490
***
 
(0.5706) 
 
Sample size 43 43 43 43 
R-squared 0.5377 0.6279 0.3525 0.4946 
Adjusted R-squared 0.4891 0.5403 0.2843 0.3757 
F-statistic 11.0514 7.1711 5.1707 4.1590 
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.8269 1.5525 1.7145 1.4110 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
*** 
Significant at 1% 
**
 Significant at 5% 
*
 Significant at 10% 
 
4.4 Conclusion  
The primary cause of strikes was ‘wages, bonus and compensation’ (WBC) which accounted 
for 98.4% in 2014. This suggested that workers mostly partake in strike activities for wage 
related reasons. WBC reached its peak in 2010 at 98.8%. The two industries with the highest 
involvement in industrial action were Mining and Community Services. The industrial share 
of working days lost was dominated by the Mining industry in 2012 (82.4%) and in 2014 
(93.6%). However, the Community Services industry had the highest share of working days 
lost in 2007 (85.6%) and in 2010 (91.3%). For the entire period of 1999-2014, the 
Community Service industry had the highest unweighted industrial share of working days lost 
(35%), followed by the Mining industry (28.2%).  
 
The number of strikes declined significantly with advent of democracy and the new LRA in 
1995 this can be seen by the negative sign of the changes in labour legislation dummy 
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variable. The results of the Granger causality tests suggest that there is positive and 
significant relationship between the strike incidence and the business cycle coincident 
indicator. Conversely, the multivariate econometric analysis indicates that a higher real 
interest rate leads to a significantly higher strike indicator, because of the positive 
relationship between the two indicators. Finally, upon conducting a multivariate econometric 
analysis on the two composite strike indices, it was found that all the explanatory variables 
are statistically significant; in particular, strikes are procyclical.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter first discusses a review of the findings of the study. Thereafter, it draws a 
conclusion based on the findings including possible recommendations for future studies.  
 
5.2 Review of findings 
Using data from the QESs, OHSs, LFSs, QLFSs, the Department of Labour’s Annual 
Industrial Action Reports as well as the ILO labour database, the study conducted three broad 
categories of empirical analysis: (1) descriptive statistics on strikes by broad industry 
category (mainly relying on the 2003-2014 Annual Industrial Action Reports data); (2) a 
static analysis which estimated the total value of production foregone due to strikes; (3) an 
econometric analysis to investigate the relationship between business cycles and strikes. 
 
On average the industries that were the most active in strikes during the whole period were 
the mining, manufacturing and community services. The number of work days and hours lost 
were particularly high in 1987, 2007, 2010, and 2014. In the year 2010 the number of work 
days and hours lost increased radically to 20.7 million due to public sector strikes. Also, the 
productivity and performances of companies as well as the economy as whole could be 
hugely impacted by the number of work days and hours lost (Department of Labour, 2013). 
 
Using the time-loss ratio as a benchmark indictor to compare strike incidences across 
different countries, it was found that the time-loss ratio of South Africa is much higher when 
compared to other upper-middle income countries. This means that South Africa is much 
more strike prune. In particular, the time-loss ratio was the highest in 1987, 2007, 2010, and 
2014. However, the results indicate that the time-loss ratio was the highest in the mining 
industry, reaching a tremendously high level of 22 720 in 2014. This result could be due to 
the fact that the mining industry has no bargaining council. Therefore, firms negotiate 
independently with the Chamber of Mines, because there are no negotiations taking place on 
a sectoral level.   
 
The primary reasons for strikes were wages, bonus and compensation (WBC). This proposes 
that most employees partake in strikes to demand greater salary increases to meet their 
socioeconomic necessities. WBC remained the main trigger for strikes over the period from 
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2003 to 2014 and it reached its peak in 2010 at 98.8%. On the hand, the two trade unions 
NUM (placed in the top five 9 out of 11 years under study) and SATAWU (placed in top five 
in 8 out of 11 years) accounted for the greatest share of working days lost due to industrial 
action.   
 
After conducting a static analysis on real GVA foregone due to industrial action, it was found 
that the total value of production foregone due to strikes as a proportion of real GVA 
aggregate reached a high of 0.50% in 2010 as a result of industrial action. This implies that 
the results found, upon conducting the static analysis was significant. In particular this 
proportion was especially high in the mining industry in 2014 and community service 
industry in 2010. Moreover, the Granger casualty test indicates the underlying relationship 
between the coincident indicator of the business cycle and the composite strike indicator (this 
was based on a study by Van der Velden and Visser in 2006). This was derived by 
considering strike occurrences, number of employees involved and the number of working 
days lost due to industrial action along with considering the relationship between the strike 
composite indicator and consumer price index.  
 
Finally, the multivariate econometric analysis suggested that strikes are procyclical and the 
results are statically significant for the entire period. Also, there was a significant positive 
relationship between real interest rate and strikes. 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
It is not always easy to measure the economic cost of strikes, whereas strikes have both 
benefits and cost. This study first examined the main concepts and theories on industrial 
action, before discussing past local and international empirical studies, and based on these 
studies found a severe research gap. The research gap suggested that there is a lack of in-
depth research on the economic impact of strikes upon the South African economy.  
Afterwards, the descriptive statistics on strikes was examined and it was found that strikes 
were quite dominant in the mining and community service industries. 
 
One limitation of the study is that it is not possible to conduct a thorough time-series 
econometric analysis, due to the relatively weaker, less comprehensive strikes data in 1970-
1998 from the ILO labour database. Also, it is only possible to conduct a more thorough 
empirical analysis like those international studies reviewed in Chapter Two if there are 
 
 
 
 
71 
 
primary survey data available (i.e. firm-level surveys that collect data on strike probability, 
wages, etc.). Therefore, it was not possible to demeanor an in-depth analysis on the likelihood 
of strikes, the length of the strike and the result of strikes.  
 
In order to estimate the economic benefits and cost more precisely, difficult techniques might 
have to be applied such as conducting a CGE model, but this would entail a study on its own, 
and therefore it would go beyond the range of this paper. Nonetheless, the ultimate 
conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that strikes do involve economic cost, and 
this cost is higher for the mining industry, especially in 2014. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1: Unionisation rate (%) by industry, 1997-2014 
Year [A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G] [H] [I] All employees 
1997 13.09 70.47 48.28 42.64 23.42 28.48 46.99 21.28 52.15 40.55 
1998 10.90 73.36 45.04 48.55 19.55 25.13 45.87 23.29 55.92 39.16 
1999 16.90 76.30 41.25 53.15 23.72 25.04 43.14 24.77 60.36 40.58 
2000 9.25 71.02 38.84 51.19 16.64 18.72 39.08 17.89 59.10 36.98 
2001 9.29 79.29 38.47 49.64 22.83 20.95 38.15 23.97 60.95 39.01 
2002 8.02 77.32 34.11 50.86 17.00 20.33 37.12 21.69 60.61 36.91 
2003 8.43 75.86 37.89 47.71 17.73 20.28 38.77 23.06 56.97 36.89 
2004 7.44 78.36 34.89 54.36 12.01 20.23 35.46 21.41 55.07 34.70 
2005 10.95 78.66 39.74 55.71 14.76 25.65 36.14 24.48 58.81 37.79 
2006 9.35 72.83 36.81 46.69 15.51 22.03 34.96 25.06 54.56 35.04 
2007 13.17 76.31 36.83 43.86 11.60 25.15 39.53 26.80 57.93 37.05 
2010 7.09 76.05 37.00 53.22 14.14 20.49 39.55 23.04 61.83 36.80 
2011 8.24 79.11 34.02 46.90 11.81 20.21 42.08 20.57 60.00 35.53 
2012 6.92 80.02 33.78 59.87 12.08 19.78 38.78 20.63 60.45 35.63 
2013 7.34 80.97 33.91 60.02 11.31 21.09 37.69 19.05 55.71 34.55 
2014 4.50 82.15 36.23 62.77 15.93 20.53 38.71 20.41 56.10 35.33 
Average 9.43 76.76 37.94 51.70 16.25 22.13 39.50 22.34 57.91 37.03 
Source: Own calculations using OHS 1999, LFS 2000-2007 September, QLFS 2008-2014 
fourth quarter, and Industrial Action Report 2003-2014 data. 
Note: [A]: Agriculture  [B]: Mining  [C]: Manufacturing [D]: Electricity 
 [E]: Construction  [F]: Wholesale & Retail [G]: Transport  [H]: Finance 
 [I]: Community services 
 
Table A.2: Industry share (%) of industrial action incidents, 1999-2014 
Year [A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G] [H] [I] All 
1999 7.48 13.08 28.04 1.87 2.80 11.21 8.41 0.93 26.17 100.00 
2000 18.75 13.75 20.00 3.75 3.75 7.50 7.50 3.75 21.25 100.00 
2001 7.23 8.43 26.51 1.20 6.02 2.41 16.87 0.00 31.33 100.00 
2002 2.13 10.64 19.15 2.13 6.38 23.40 8.51 0.00 27.66 100.00 
2003 8.06 12.90 22.58 4.84 3.23 12.90 19.35 1.61 14.52 100.00 
2004 10.20 18.37 26.53 2.04 0.00 8.16 8.16 4.08 22.45 100.00 
2005 5.88 15.69 26.47 1.96 1.96 10.78 13.73 2.94 20.59 100.00 
2006 5.05 7.07 9.09 1.01 2.02 7.07 15.15 5.05 48.48 100.00 
2007 4.00 22.67 21.33 1.33 4.00 5.33 12.00 4.00 25.33 100.00 
2008 3.51 12.28 17.54 0.00 3.51 7.02 12.28 8.77 35.09 100.00 
2009 3.92 19.61 15.69 1.96 1.96 7.84 21.57 7.84 19.61 100.00 
2010 1.35 22.97 21.62 2.70 2.70 5.41 16.22 12.16 14.86 100.00 
2011 7.46 22.39 17.91 4.48 2.99 2.99 20.90 16.42 4.48 100.00 
2012 14.14 28.28 6.06 1.01 5.05 3.03 18.18 19.19 5.05 100.00 
2013 4.39 21.93 20.18 0.88 2.63 1.75 7.89 29.82 10.53 100.00 
2014 6.82 5.68 29.55 2.27 6.82 2.27 6.82 34.09 5.68 100.00 
Average 6.90 15.98 20.52 2.09 3.49 7.44 13.35 9.42 20.82 100.00 
Source: Own calculations using the data from the 2003-2014 Industrial Action Reports. 
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Table A.3: Mean monthly nominal income (Rands) of formal sector employees by 
industry, 2004-2014 
Year [A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G] [H] [I] 
2004 1 075 6 513 6 388 14 768 4 279 5 034 10 180 6 724 8 681 
2005 1 232 6 753 6 547 14 002 4 327 4 819 10 422 7 444 8 384 
2006 1 371 7 221 6 912 14 120 4 977 5 259 10 672 8 826 8 942 
2007 1 549 8 303 7 456 15 478 5 473 5 677 11 171 9 782 9 810 
2008 1 700 9 820 8 313 17 773 6 227 6 419 12 099 10 470 10 908 
2009 1 852 11 128 9 179 21 114 7 259 6 924 13 397 11 441 11 858 
2010 2 004 12 220 10 418 23 866 8 790 7 790 14 880 12 854 13 953 
2011 2 204 13 496 11 510 25 024 9 378 8 363 16 348 14 108 14 528 
2012 2 254 14 901 12 520 27 359 10 409 8 886 17 222 14 817 16 427 
2013 2 769 16 330 13 659 29 714 11 460 10 095 18 539 16 080 17 457 
2014 3 422 16 923 14 511 32 275 12 268 11 024 20 104 17 243 18 589 
Source: Own calculations using the data from the 2003-2014 Industrial Action Reports. 
 
Table A.4: Mean usual weekly work hours of formal sector employees by industry, 
2004-2014 
Year [A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G] [H] [I] 
2004 50.20 47.72 45.64 43.65 47.16 46.42 48.42 46.16 42.50 
2005 50.80 48.91 46.95 47.93 47.44 47.90 50.25 47.93 43.19 
2006 49.43 47.37 45.64 43.68 46.27 46.67 49.09 46.79 42.12 
2007 48.94 47.99 45.31 43.30 45.72 46.14 47.48 46.86 42.07 
2008 47.64 47.03 44.44 42.72 45.10 46.72 48.44 46.57 41.92 
2009 47.33 46.64 43.57 43.48 43.90 46.45 46.99 45.83 41.36 
2010 46.62 46.73 43.61 43.57 43.05 45.96 46.95 45.93 41.31 
2011 46.67 45.67 43.81 43.34 43.06 45.86 47.64 45.51 41.59 
2012 46.52 46.00 43.44 43.34 42.46 46.02 46.91 45.85 41.42 
2013 45.94 46.23 43.55 42.31 42.67 45.76 46.98 45.16 40.95 
2014 45.68 46.19 43.58 41.91 42.54 45.67 46.75 45.42 40.64 
Source: Own calculations using the data from the 2003-2014 Industrial Action Reports. 
 
Table A.5: Nature of industrial action (%), 2003-2014 
Year 
Strike 
company 
only 
Picketing 
Secondary 
action 
Stay-
away/protest 
Multi-
employer 
strike 
Lockout All 
2003 74.19 6.45 1.61 4.84 8.06 4.84 100.00 
2004 48.98 10.20 2.04 14.29 14.29 10.20 100.00 
2005 40.20 4.90 1.96 9.80 27.45 15.65 100.00 
2006 56.57 10.10 0.00 17.17 11.11 5.05 100.00 
2007 50.67 9.33 1.33 8.00 24.00 6.67 100.00 
2008 29.82 3.52 1.75 29.82 31.58 3.51 100.00 
2009 37.25 9.80 3.92 21.57 9.80 17.65 100.00 
2010 48.65 5.41 2.70 2.70 36.49 4.05 100.00 
2011 71.64 0.00 5.97 2.99 14.93 4.48 100.00 
2012 59.60 0.00 1.01 15.15 16.16 8.08 100.00 
2013 71.05 0.00 0.88 3.51 24.56 0.00 100.00 
2014 50.00 1.14 1.14 2.27 15.91 29.55 100.00 
Average 53.22 5.07 2.03 11.01 19.53 9.15 100.00 
Source: Own calculations using the data from the 2003-2014 Industrial Action Reports. 
 
 
 
 
83 
 
Table A.6: Duration of industrial action (%), 2003-2014 
Year 
<1 
day 
1-5 
days 
6-10 
days 
11-15 
days 
16-20  
days 
21-30 
days 
31-40 
days 
40+  
days 
All 
2003 6.45 50.00 9.68 11.29 4.84 6.45 6.45 4.84 100.00 
2004 12.24 40.82 10.20 14.29 8.16 6.12 2.04 6.12 100.00 
2005 8.80 27.50 21.60 11.80 7.80 7.80 5.90 80.80 100.00 
2006 7.90 57.00 14.90 3.50 1.80 5.30 2.60 7.00 100.00 
2007 8.90 30.70 35.70 9.70 3.20 5.60 3.20 3.20 100.00 
2008 8.50 65.10 9.40 4.70 6.60 1.90 1.90 1.90 100.00 
2009 2.20 16.20 49.10 26.60 2.20 1.80 0.50 1.40 100.00 
2010 6.20 20.80 44.40 15.70 3.90 4.50 1.10 3.40 100.00 
2011 0.50 13.20 52.30 12.90 14.60 3.80 1.20 1.40 100.00 
2012 0.00 22.20 38.50 16.40 5.90 9.10 1.70 2.10 100.00 
2013 0.00 26.30 15.10 19.80 21.00 14.50 1.10 2.20 100.00 
2014 0.00 25.10 3.70 7.40 44.70 10.20 0.90 7.90 100.00 
Average 5.14 32.91 25.37 12.84 10.39 6.42 2.38 4.19 100.00 
Source: Own calculations using the data from the 2003-2014 Industrial Action Reports. 
 
Table A.7: Industrial action by size of establishment (%), 2003-2014 
Year <50 
50-
149 
150-
299 
300-
499 
500-
999 
1000+ All 
2003 14.29 21.43 11.43 11.43 11.43 30.00 100.00 
2004 12.50 18.75 16.67 4.17 21.88 26.04 100.00 
2005 6.40 21.80 18.30 20.40 21.80 11.30 100.00 
2006 7.80 15.90 14.90 12.30 12.30 36.80 100.00 
2007 20.20 15.30 12.10 6.50 13.70 32.20 100.00 
2008 9.40 9.40 12.30 8.50 18.90 41.50 100.00 
2009 23.90 22.50 16.20 11.30 12.60 13.50 100.00 
2010 9.00 8.40 16.30 23.60 14.60 28.10 100.00 
2011 33.30 25.80 13.00 6.80 7.50 13.50 100.00 
2012 30.40 19.30 12.80 9.20 8.70 19.60 100.00 
2013 26.40 24.30 15.50 7.70 11.40 14.80 100.00 
2014 21.20 19.80 20.70 10.60 7.80 19.80 100.00 
Average 17.90 18.60 15.00 11.00 13.60 23.90 100.00 
Source: Own calculations using the data from the 2003-2014 Industrial Action Reports. 
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Table A.8: Number of formal sector employees involved in industrial actions by 
industry, 1999-2014 
Year [A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G] [H] [I] All 
1999 5 819 64 271 52 999 438 12 390 2 245 62 566 120 354 587 555 435 
2000 2 221 170 193 63 850 23 17 113 11 761 118 770 10 758 487 1 142 428 
2001 806 12 367 32 678 2 126 1 124 45 11 042  30 204 90 392 
2002 400 21 647 5 303 16 329 1 363 3 430 0 33 762 66 250 
2003 2 958 23 078 18 021 4 576 8 730 14 118 8 840 0 3 200 83 521 
2004 3 230 44 922 16 690 20 0 637 1 440 1 963 326 399 395 301 
2005 7 554 165 791 55 649 406 4 006 46 634 54 271 2 018 62 962 399 291 
2006 2 820 85 396 14 555 6 447 78 63 553 35 723 16 488 25 727 250 787 
2007 2 753 161 193 98 839 69 7 052 466 3 470 3 003 332 074 608 919 
2008 411 46 911 24 669 0 857 6 454 15 241 999 23 437 118 979 
2009 534 27 480 31 027 79 40 716 9 363 31 491 2 850 29 187 172 727 
2010 54 12 626 25 663 3 985 233 33 659 36 791 6 495 1 072 307 1 191 813 
2011 2 608 47 732 66 042 70 2 734 3 466 5 594 424 74 468 203 138 
2012 11 078 138 993 56 324 1 078 2 793 4 170 12 900 160 13 877 241 373 
2013 8 417 204 661 21 718 1 458 13 083 1 939 22 331 1 066 22 520 297 193 
2014 2 056 74 580 25 641 788 851 1 500 1 224 249 11 677 118 566 
Source: Own calculations using the data from the 2003-2014 Industrial Action Reports. 
 
Table A.9: Industry share (%) of formal sector employees involved in industrial actions, 
1999-2014 
Year [A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G] [H] [I] All 
1999 1.05 11.57 9.54 0.08 2.23 0.40 11.26 0.02 63.84 100.00 
2000 0.19 14.90 5.59 0.00 1.50 1.03 10.40 0.00 66.39 100.00 
2001 0.89 13.68 36.15 2.35 1.24 0.05 12.22 0.00 33.41 100.00 
2002 0.60 32.67 8.00 0.02 0.50 2.06 5.18 0.00 50.96 100.00 
2003 3.54 27.63 21.58 5.48 10.45 16.90 10.58 0.00 3.83 100.00 
2004 0.82 11.36 4.22 0.01 0.00 0.16 0.36 0.50 82.57 100.00 
2005 1.89 41.52 13.94 0.10 1.00 11.68 13.59 0.51 15.77 100.00 
2006 1.12 34.05 5.80 2.57 0.03 25.34 14.24 6.57 10.26 100.00 
2007 0.45 26.47 16.23 0.01 1.16 0.08 0.57 0.49 54.54 100.00 
2008 0.35 39.43 20.73 0.00 0.72 5.42 12.81 0.84 19.70 100.00 
2009 0.31 15.91 17.96 0.05 23.57 5.42 18.23 1.65 16.90 100.00 
2010 0.00 1.06 2.15 0.33 0.02 2.82 3.09 0.54 89.97 100.00 
2011 1.28 23.50 32.51 0.03 1.35 1.71 2.75 0.21 36.66 100.00 
2012 4.59 57.58 23.33 0.45 1.16 1.73 5.34 0.07 5.75 100.00 
2013 2.83 68.86 7.31 0.49 4.40 0.65 7.51 0.36 7.58 100.00 
2014 1.73 62.90 21.63 0.66 0.72 1.27 1.03 0.21 9.85 100.00 
“Average” 1.35 30.19 15.42 0.79 3.13 4.80 8.07 0.75 35.50 100.00 
Source: Own calculations using OHS 1999, LFS 2000-2007 September, QLFS 2008-2014 
fourth quarter, and Industrial Action Reports 2003-2014 data. 
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Table A.10: Percentage (%) of formal sector employees involved in industrial actions by 
industry, 1999-2014 
Year [A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G] [H] [I] All 
1999 0.78 13.72 4.20 0.60 4.25 0.18 15.83 0.02 20.33 7.95 
2000 0.33 29.15 5.03 0.03 5.09 0.97 29.37 0.00 42.36 15.84 
2001 0.12 2.26 2.44 2.29 0.37 0.00 2.81 0.00 1.73 1.26 
2002 0.05 3.94 0.38 0.02 0.10 0.12 0.81 0.00 1.88 0.89 
2003 0.39 4.21 1.39 5.18 2.46 1.06 2.39 0.00 0.17 1.10 
2004 0.57 11.14 1.17 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.36 0.20 16.81 5.12 
2005 1.45 40.71 4.01 0.43 0.75 2.90 12.69 0.19 3.32 5.02 
2006 0.52 21.63 1.02 5.60 0.01 3.67 8.44 1.46 1.27 3.02 
2007 0.45 37.86 6.95 0.08 1.15 0.03 0.69 0.23 14.71 6.72 
2008 0.08 14.71 1.55 0.00 0.12 0.35 2.81 0.07 0.91 1.24 
2009 0.08 7.97 1.74 0.09 4.82 0.47 5.75 0.19 1.21 1.70 
2010 0.01 3.96 1.59 3.84 0.03 1.86 6.93 0.40 44.57 12.31 
2011 0.48 13.63 4.09 0.08 0.40 0.18 0.97 0.03 2.73 2.01 
2012 1.83 36.94 3.63 1.10 0.40 0.23 2.15 0.01 0.49 2.35 
2013 1.44 48.47 1.46 1.18 1.80 0.10 3.53 0.06 0.75 2.77 
2014 0.35 17.63 1.70 0.78 0.11 0.07 0.18 0.01 0.38 1.09 
Average 0.56 19.24 2.65 1.33 1.37 0.76 5.98 0.18 9.60 4.40 
Source: Own calculations using OHS 1999, LFS 2000-2007 September, QLFS 2008-2014 
fourth quarter, and Industrial Action Reports 2003-2014 data. 
 
Table A.11: Number of work hours lost (1 000s) due to industrial action by industry, 
2003-2014 
Year [A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G] [H] [I] All 
2003 226 2 771 1 710 215 607 1 926 394 1 237 8086 
2004 487 7 014 1 051 2 0 23 455 312 3 516 12 861 
2005 819 13 768 2 562 3 53 1 283 4 290 77 2 829 25 684 
2006 410 941 1 669 127 1 9 729 1 262 11 266 8 437 33 842 
2007 92 4 155 5 355 3 182 81 166 88 45 154 55 275 
2008 77 744 529 0 146 47 865 132 889 3 429 
2009 242 2 872 2 449 0 2 382 198 1 848 54 1485 11 529 
2010 1 1 161 3 026 31 18 2 524 4 239 169 150 685 161 853 
2011 1 181 28 428 8 685 0 167 2 195 406 8 11 500 52 571 
2012 1 107 19 790 1 391 11 88 115 1 136 8 890 24 534 
2013 608 3 631 3 338 26 2 207 458 3 826 163 1 239 15 497 
2014 208 104 178 3 967 190 129 329 205 24 589 109 818 
Average 455 15 788 2 978 51 498 1 576 1 591 1 025 18 954 42 915 
Source: Own calculations using the data from the 2003-2014 Industrial Action Reports. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
86 
 
Table A.12: Industry share (%) of work hours lost due to industrial action, 2003-2014 
Year [A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G] [H] [I] All 
2003 2.79 34.27 21.14 2.66 7.50 23.82 4.87 0.01 2.93 100.00 
2004 3.79 54.54 8.18 0.01 0.00 0.18 3.54 2.42 27.34 100.00 
2005 3.19 53.61 9.97 0.01 0.20 5.00 16.70 0.30 11.01 100.00 
2006 1.21 2.78 4.93 0.38 0.00 28.75 3.73 33.29 24.93 100.00 
2007 0.17 7.52 9.69 0.00 0.33 0.15 0.30 0.16 81.69 100.00 
2008 2.23 21.69 15.42 0.00 4.26 1.37 25.23 3.86 25.92 100.00 
2009 2.10 24.91 21.24 0.00 20.66 1.71 16.03 0.46 12.88 100.00 
2010 0.00 0.72 1.87 0.02 0.01 1.56 2.62 0.10 93.10 100.00 
2011 2.25 54.08 16.52 0.00 0.32 4.17 0.77 0.01 21.88 100.00 
2012 4.51 80.66 5.67 0.04 0.36 0.47 4.63 0.03 3.63 100.00 
2013 3.92 23.43 21.54 0.17 14.24 2.96 24.69 1.05 8.00 100.00 
2014 0.19 94.86 3.61 0.17 0.12 0.30 0.19 0.02 0.54 100.00 
Average 2.20 37.76 11.65 0.29 4.00 5.87 8.61 3.48 26.15 100.00 
Source: Own calculations using the data from the 2003-2014 Industrial Action Reports. 
 
Table A.13: Real GVA as it is (R million, 2010 prices), 2004-2014 
Year [A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G] [H] [I] Total 
2004 56 119 244 180 311 011 62 128 55 647 294 461 183 612 389 889 446 079 2 043 126 
2005 57 695 246 687 330 307 65 450 62 280 315 210 193 334 412 149 464 616 2 147 728 
2006 54 544 245 224 351 572 67 688 68 780 333 999 203 224 451 896 481 829 2 258 756 
2007 56 168 243 662 370 389 70 000 79 455 352 698 218 488 484 675 505 443 2 380 978 
2008 67 072 230 663 378 964 67 522 87 300 358 880 226 136 511 716 530 984 2 459 237 
2009 65 802 218 830 338 692 66 337 94 759 354 870 225 712 517 114 541 936 2 424 052 
2010 65 605 230 350 358 699 67 940 95 453 370 580 229 499 523 526 553 208 2 494 860 
2011 66 913 228 646 369 582 68 978 95 860 385 696 237 442 545 802 576 059 2 574 978 
2012 68 093 221 990 377 330 68 733 98 329 400 938 243 188 562 042 591 938 2 632 581 
2013 70 577 230 772 380 434 68 311 102 811 408 370 249 916 576 368 608 099 2 695 658 
2014 75 416 227 521 380 841 67 450 106 531 413 975 257 543 589 969 622 718 2 741 964 
Data source: Quarterly Bulletin of the South African Reserve Bank. 
 
Table A.14: Real GVA had strikes not happened (R million, 2010 prices), 2004-2014 
Year [A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G] [H] [I] Total 
2004 56 122 244 763 311 054 62 128 55 647 294 462 183 640 389 904 446 339 2 044 059 
2005 57 702 247 695 330 409 65 450 62 282 315 255 193 583 412 153 464 805 2 149 333 
2006 54 547 245 285 351 648 67 709 68 780 334 363 203 290 452 533 482 413 2 260 569 
2007 56 169 243 918 370 638 70 000 79 461 352 701 218 497 484 680 508 671 2 384 735 
2008 67 073 230 705 378 989 67 522 87 304 358 882 226 187 511 724 531 049 2 459 435 
2009 65 804 219 002 338 810 66 337 94 849 354 878 225 835 517 117 542 044 2 424 676 
2010 65 605 230 420 358 866 67 944 95 454 370 679 229 809 523 537 564 953 2 507 266 
2011 66 925 230 341 370 119 68 978 95 868 385 784 237 472 545 803 576 931 2 578 219 
2012 68 105 223 219 377 422 68 734 98 333 400 943 243 269 562 043 592 011 2 634 078 
2013 70 585 231 009 380 655 68 313 102 919 408 390 250 187 576 380 608 202 2 696 640 
2014 75 419 234 524 381 092 67 468 106 537 413 990 257 558 589 971 622 768 2 749 328 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
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Table A.15: Number of work days lost (million) due to industrial action by industry, 
1999-2014 
Year [A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G] [H] [I] All 
1999 0.09 0.27 0.23 0.00 0.11 0.09 0.44 0.00 1.39 2.63 
2000 0.01 0.36 0.13 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.12 0.00 0.92 1.67 
2001 0.01 0.23 0.41 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.10 0.95 
2002 0.00 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.62 
2003 0.03 0.28 0.20 0.02 0.07 0.25 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.92 
2004 0.06 0.54 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.46 1.29 
2005 0.10 0.93 0.31 0.00 0.01 0.33 0.55 0.01 0.38 2.63 
2006 0.04 0.12 0.20 0.02 0.00 1.27 0.16 1.30 1.03 4.15 
2007 0.03 0.54 0.70 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.01 8.16 9.53 
2008 0.01 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.18 0.50 
2009 0.03 0.41 0.32 0.00 0.26 0.02 0.25 0.01 0.22 1.53 
2010 0.00 0.36 0.38 0.01 0.00 0.39 0.64 0.02 18.87 20.67 
2011 0.02 0.37 0.83 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.00 1.46 2.81 
2012 0.12 2.73 0.19 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.00 0.11 3.31 
2013 0.06 0.52 0.34 0.00 0.25 0.05 0.48 0.02 0.12 1.85 
2014 0.02 9.61 0.47 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.07 10.26 
Average 0.04 1.09 0.31 0.00 0.05 0.17 0.21 0.09 2.12 4.08 
Source: Own calculations using the data from the 2003-2014 Industrial Action Reports. 
 
Table A.16: Industry share (%) of work days lost due to industrial action, 1999-2014 
Year [A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G] [H] [I] All 
1999 3.57 10.15 8.59 0.03 4.31 3.57 16.89 0.01 52.87 100.00 
2000 0.63 21.81 7.62 0.08 1.08 6.26 7.29 0.00 55.23 100.00 
2001 1.37 24.02 43.28 0.58 0.62 0.01 19.78 0.00 10.34 100.00 
2002 0.71 15.36 6.80 0.00 0.51 2.50 0.76 0.00 73.36 100.00 
2003 3.13 30.35 22.02 2.41 7.75 27.08 5.30 0.02 1.93 100.00 
2004 4.64 42.35 8.17 0.02 0.00 0.29 5.65 2.75 36.12 100.00 
2005 3.88 35.49 11.66 0.01 0.39 12.66 20.98 0.40 14.54 100.00 
2006 1.05 2.79 4.79 0.47 0.02 30.67 3.96 31.37 24.88 100.00 
2007 0.32 5.63 7.30 0.00 0.53 0.19 0.27 0.10 85.65 100.00 
2008 1.83 16.59 14.49 0.00 3.10 3.18 21.43 2.63 36.75 100.00 
2009 1.95 27.08 20.77 0.00 17.33 1.62 16.56 0.61 14.08 100.00 
2010 0.00 1.75 1.86 0.04 0.02 1.91 3.10 0.07 91.25 100.00 
2011 0.57 13.20 29.43 0.00 1.00 1.79 1.91 0.03 52.06 100.00 
2012 3.73 82.43 5.70 0.04 0.31 0.40 4.08 0.03 3.27 100.00 
2013 3.49 27.94 18.58 0.17 13.55 2.56 25.84 1.11 6.76 100.00 
2014 0.21 93.64 4.55 0.14 0.10 0.39 0.25 0.03 0.69 100.00 
Average 1.94 28.16 13.48 0.25 3.16 5.94 9.63 2.45 34.99 100.00 
Source: Own calculations using the data from the 2003-2014 Industrial Action Report. 
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Table A.17: Time-loss ratios by industry – including all employees, 1999-2014 
 [A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G] [H] [I] All 
1999 103.49 561.09 167.54 11.03 264.20 67.30 969.67 0.44 753.27 338.66 
2000 11.44 606.99 92.95 13.82 33.31 75.76 249.43 0.02 482.25 203.93 
2001 15.51 415.64 290.36 59.12 12.95 0.08 405.69 0.00 53.79 119.92 
2002 4.63 170.51 29.38 0.19 7.12 12.15 9.63 0.00 241.66 76.98 
2003 32.98 507.42 150.36 246.47 143.57 173.59 107.02 0.19 8.90 112.46 
2004 84.49 1 347.46 70.95 2.03 0.00 2.46 154.28 35.58 230.93 154.40 
2005 164.17 2 278.97 210.40 3.92 13.11 189.40 1 059.58 9.29 189.70 299.68 
2006 67.26 291.94 132.56 167.40 1.20 688.76 328.54 1 123.53 490.56 458.49 
2007 43.21 1 247.04 470.65 3.61 63.98 9.61 45.79 7.29 3 422.64 980.07 
2008 12.32 238.88 38.76 0.00 15.53 7.10 151.61 8.29 71.41 44.84 
2009 51.73 1 293.04 188.65 0.44 282.64 12.12 379.59 5.44 83.23 143.91 
2010 0.18 1 129.42 231.66 82.40 4.62 188.21 966.39 10.03 6 887.68 1 969.15 
2011 26.22 1 056.73 488.74 0.81 33.99 22.97 75.49 0.60 506.74 255.78 
2012 183.26 7 212.18 117.67 14.91 12.27 6.31 182.96 0.55 36.38 297.30 
2013 96.64 1 212.88 218.74 26.01 272.34 20.58 598.35 11.14 39.33 156.46 
2014 30.86 22 515.85 299.43 139.84 10.89 17.00 30.14 1.69 21.80 852.87 
Average 58.02 2 630.38 199.92 48.25 73.23 93.34 357.14 75.88 845.02 404.06 
Source: Own calculations using OHS 1999, LFS 2000-2007 September, QLFS 2008-2014 
fourth quarter, and Industrial Action Reports 2003-2014 data. 
 
Table A.18: Time-loss ratios by industry – including formal sector employees only, 
1999-2014 
 [A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G] [H] [I] All 
1999 124.77 568.88 178.76 11.53 388.61 77.20 1122.04 0.46 795.79 375.81 
2000 15.32 623.91 100.24 14.25 53.74 86.31 301.15 0.02 515.08 231.58 
2001 19.28 418.32 307.63 59.94 19.49 0.09 479.95 0.00 56.32 132.40 
2002 5.59 172.16 30.33 0.19 9.73 13.22 11.06 0.00 251.57 83.18 
2003 38.23 508.96 156.58 251.20 200.69 186.72 131.95 0.20 9.22 121.38 
2004 104.81 1 350.11 73.70 2.04 0.00 2.61 180.01 36.39 239.23 166.70 
2005 195.74 2 290.08 220.45 4.01 19.06 206.96 1 289.11 9.60 201.55 330.13 
2006 80.53 293.66 139.70 168.00 1.73 735.64 389.16 1 155.22 511.07 499.27 
2007 49.72 1 260.55 488.95 3.85 82.69 10.02 51.34 7.60 3 614.09 1 051.40 
2008 17.54 258.76 45.38 0.00 22.45 8.60 196.41 9.17 70.72 51.84 
2009 46.54 1 198.65 177.46 0.54 313.35 12.42 461.70 6.19 89.13 150.43 
2010 0.22 1 132.69 239.21 74.11 4.74 217.74 1 206.26 9.45 7 842.08 2 135.49 
2011 29.41 1 057.58 511.38 0.81 40.52 25.74 92.43 0.63 536.02 278.16 
2012 203.76 7 251.65 121.69 15.18 14.46 7.17 224.84 0.58 38.48 322.86 
2013 110.60 1 221.99 230.72 26.15 343.98 23.36 754.95 11.69 41.79 172.10 
2014 35.71 22 719.58 310.14 143.97 14.06 19.47 36.47 1.77 23.31 940.48 
Average 67.36 2 645.47 208.27 48.48 95.58 102.08 433.05 78.06 927.22 440.20 
Source: Own calculations using OHS 1999, LFS 2000-2007 September, QLFS 2008-2014 
fourth quarter, and Industrial Action Reports 2003-2014 data. 
 
 
 
 
